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1. Introduction: Purpose, Terminology and Scope 
 
Despite the dramatic growth of ‘environmental law’ over recent years, the coherence 
of the subject remains open to debate. Laws relating to pollution control, biodiversity 
protection and regulation of land use adopt sharply contrasting approaches 
towards markedly different concerns which often seem to have little, if anything, in 
common. Repeated initiatives directed towards the ‘integration’ of the different 
parts of the subject presuppose, rather than articulate, the common elements of the 
distinct areas of concern. The fundamental questions of what ‘the environment’ 
encompasses and what legal approaches are needed to ‘protect’ or ‘enhance’ it, and 
why, are as open to debate as ever they were. 
The challenge of a unified theory of environmental ontology must wait for another 
day and another author, but the scope for greater integration of legal methodology 
is a more accessible field of investigation. The purpose of this article was to explore the 
scope for a better-coordinated approach across two different branches of environmental 
law. More specifically, the aim is to examine the extent to which regulatory 
approaches to the protection of the environmental media of water, air and land can 
be more closely paralleled in regulation applicable to the living things dependent 
upon those media. In essence, the issue to be addressed is the extent to which it is 
feasible for biodiversity law to parallel regulatory strategies that have been adopted 
in relation to pollution control? 
For the purposes of this discussion, a rather stipulative approach to terminology is 
needed to draw out a contrast between the inanimate and animate components of 
our surroundings. Hence, ‘the environment’ is used hereafter in a narrow sense, 
encompassing only issues relating to the media of air, water and land.1 ‘Environmental 
quality law’, therefore, is normally concerned with the contamination or 
pollution2 of these physical media by substances that are present through human 
* William Howarth, Professor of Environmental Law, University of Kent (w.howarth@kent.ac.uk). Previous 
versions of this article were delivered as a seminar for staff at Newcastle Law School on 24 November 2004 and 
a seminar for postgraduate students at Kent Law School on 1 December 2004. The author is grateful to those who 
offered comment at these seminars and particularly to Dr Jane Holder, University College London, Donald 
McGillivray, University of Kent and anonymous reviewers for useful suggestions for improvement of an earlier draft. 
1 Similarly, see section 1(2) Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
2 For a discussion of the contrasting meanings of ‘contamination’ and ‘pollution’, see W. Howarth and 
D. McGillivray, Water Pollution and Water Quality Law (2001) section 1.3. 
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intervention and perceived to be capable of being harmful. By contrast, the living 
components of the ambience, their interrelationships and relationships with the 
environmental media can be seen as parts of a global ecosystem, or biosphere, and 
the law relating to this is characterised as ‘ecological law’. Certainly, ‘environmental’ 
and ‘ecological’ are commonly used in other senses in different contexts, and quite 
often without their precise sense being made clear, but, for the following discussion, 
an explicit discrimination is needed between laws relating to living things and those 
that relate to the inanimate physical media that support them. The critical question 
of how human beings feature within ecosystems must necessarily be broached, but 
this issue is reserved for later discussion.3 
This separation between environmental and ecological law is needed, not least, to 
emphasise contrasts between the different ways in which the two branches of the law 
have developed historically and to chart their respective states of progress. If anything, 
environmental and ecological laws are measured by their consequences in 
halting harms and securing perceived ‘improvements’. The firm view taken here is 
that restricting human activities for environmental or ecological reasons is not an 
end in itself, but a means of achieving such improvements. However, the approach 
of using the law purposively, to achieve defined objectives, rather than simply as a 
means of prohibiting miscellaneous instances of undesired conduct, has progressed 
much further in environmental quality law than in ecological law. Despite the 
retarded progress in formulating explicit objectives for ecological law, a consequentialist 
approach is gaining momentum through the more explicit status that has 
been given to ecological objectives in recent European Community legislation. 
Whilst this progress is generally to be welcomed, some reservations need to be 
offered about the approach that has been taken to formulating ‘ecological quality 
standards’ and the basis for ecological valuation that seems to underlie initial initiatives 
in this respect. 
Some explicit boundaries to the discussion are needed from the outset. Alongside 
the fermentation processes of politics, economics and a range of social concerns, 
environmental and ecological policies have to be recognised as culturally and 
geographically determined. Different nations, quite rightly, adopt different priorities, 
and any attempt to detach these priorities from their context will inevitably be 
misleading. For this reason, it has to be stressed that the context of the present 
work is the regulation of the environment and ecosystems of the UK placed, as it is, 
within a body legislation adopted at European Community level and influenced 
by a range of wider regional and international commitments. The point to be 
emphasised is that the UK, and particularly England and Wales, is amongst the 
most heavily industrialised and extensively developed countries in the world. For 
that reason, literature detailing legal approaches to conservation and management 
of supposed ‘wilderness’ areas, apparently untouched by human impacts, has 
limited relevance. The geographical context excludes wildernesses of a kind that 
are found in other countries, and the historical impacts that have shaped the 
national terrain, its environmental media and biodiversity need to be appropriately 
accommodated and valued in a contextually specific approach to ecological 
legislation. 
3 See Section 5.3 below (‘Human Beings and Ecosystems’) on the role of humans in ecosystems. 
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A second qualification is that the discussion focuses primarily upon developments 
in the regulation of the aquatic environment. Legislation concerning water quality 
has, historically, been amongst the most precocious and progressive in both national 
and European Community law.4 In relation to ecological quality, it is evident that the 
most significant and momentous developments are taking place in relation to 
aquatic species and ecosystems. This is not to suggest any particular priority over 
other environmental media, but merely that impacts on water and its living constituents 
are being seen as more immediately accessible to regulation than other sectors. 
The principles that are emerging to address the aquatic environment may eventually 
be reapplied to other sectors of the environmental media and to non-aquatic biodiversity, 
but water is being used as a testing ground. 
Inevitably, therefore, a primary focus of the article is upon the ecological elements of 
the European Community Water Framework Directive,5 viewed from a national context. 
First, the Directive needs to be seen as providing the foremost example of the application 
of ecological quality standards in Community Law and contrasting markedly with 
the use of obscure or generalised ecological standards in previous legislation. Second, 
the Directive needs to be seen as being founded upon a particular conception of ecological 
goals based, broadly, on the idea of ‘naturalness’. The concluding parts of the article 
offer some reservations as to whether this approach is appropriate in the UK context. 
 
2. The Progression from Prohibitions to Standards 
 
The starting point for the discussion is the progression from a reactive approach to 
perceived environmental quality problems to a purposive approach directed towards 
securing defined objectives. The traditional, human-centred, conception is that the 
surroundings that humans inhabit are for human benefit and must be regulated 
accordingly.6 Hence, the history of environmental quality law is a sequence of 
responses to progressively identified adversities needing a legal response. Broadly, 
these have been the need to prevent transmission of disease (through public or environmental 
health legislation); to prevent human beings being poisoned by water, air 
or land (through pollution-control restrictions); the need to preserve public amenity 
in land use (through planning law); and to meet aesthetic and cultural requirements 
for both the built and the natural environment (through protection of 
buildings and landscapes).7 From a human perspective, the evolution of environmental 
4 See D. Freestone, ‘European Community Environmental Policy and Law’ in R. Churchill, L. Warren and 
J. Gibson (eds), Law, Policy and the Environment (1991) at 143 (quoting S.P. Johnson and G. Corcelle, The Environmental 
Policy of the European Communities (1989) at 25) and G. McLeod, ‘Approaches to Setting of Priorities and 
Policies Amongst Water Quality Protection and Enhancement Alternatives: the European Community’ in 
P. Thomas (ed.), Water Pollution: Law and Liability (1993) at 8. 
5 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy. For initial national transposition, see Water Environment 
(Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2003, SI 2003 No. 3242. 
6 For an interesting recent discussion of the traditional instrumental focus of thinking about the environment 
and its philosophical roots, see S. Coyle and K. Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: 
Property, Right and Nature (2004). 
7 See D. Hughes et al, Environmental Law (4th edn, 2002) Chapter 1 and S. Bell and D. McGillivray, Environmental 
Law (6th edn, 2005) Chapter 2, for introductions to the historical development of environmental law in 
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quality lawmaking represents an evolving hierarchy of priorities that have been 
addressed by legislation enacted in a broadly corresponding chronological order. 
The key points to be appreciated about this hierarchy are its reactivity and negativity. 
The awareness that some state of affairs can be characterised as ‘an environmental 
quality problem’, and the generation of sufficient consensus that it is cost 
beneficial to address it through legislation, is followed by legal mechanisms to prohibit 
or regulate the activity, usually by qualified prohibitions of various kinds.8 Until 
fairly recently at least, the focus has been upon what things laws can be used to prevent, 
rather that what positive environmental goals laws can facilitate. Legislatures 
and environmental activists seem to have had firm convictions about what activities 
needed to be banned, but have tended to reflect less fully upon what state of the 
environment should count as ‘satisfactory’ or ‘acceptable’, nor how that state might 
be realised by legal means.9 
The major turning point in environmental quality law was the recognition that it 
could be redirected towards the realisation of positively stated environmental quality 
objectives specified through precisely formulated environmental quality standards.10 
Despite long-standing national opposition,11 the key initiatives in this respect have 
come from the European Community environmental legislative programme. Illustrations 
are numerous of fairly early Community directives establishing standards for 
water and air quality.12 Typically, these consist of a scientifically informed numerical 
specification of what concentration of a particular contaminant is permissibly 
present in some part of an environmental media, with corresponding obligations 
upon the Member States to take necessary legal and administrative measures to 
ensure that each parameter is realised. 
It should be noted, however, that these ostensible environmental quality standards 
are actually strongly anthropocentric in character, insofar as they are primarily 
guided by scientific knowledge of levels of exposure to different substances that are 
likely to cause adverse health effects in human beings. What purports to be an ‘environmental 
quality standard’, on closer examination, often actually turns out to be 
public health standard, almost entirely orientated towards the protection of human 
welfare and neglecting the requirements of non-humans. A neat illustration of this is 
provided in the European Community Directive concerned with limit values and 
8 See Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twenty-first Report, Setting Environmental Standards 
(1998) Cm 4053 para 1.32 to 1.33 on the implications of increasing environmental awareness. 
9 Similarly, on the lack of focus upon environmental goals in the United States, see W.F. Pedersen, ‘“Protecting 
the Environment” – What Does that Mean?’, 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (1994) 969. 
10 ‘Standard’ is here being used in a narrow sense of a statement of precise chemical and physical parameters 
that determine the acceptability of a part of an environmental medium for a particular purpose. Hence, a contrast 
is to be drawn with an environmental quality objective, which states the general purposes for which an 
environmental medium is to be used, whereas an environmental quality standard defines, in precisely stated 
parameters, what quality is needed for that purpose to be realised. Generally see W. Howarth and D. McGillivray, 
Water Pollution and Water Quality Law (2001) sections 1.4.3 to 5 on the contrast between water quality 
objectives and water quality standards. See also, Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twenty-first 
Report, Setting Environmental Standards (1998) Cm 4053, at 4 and Annex C, setting out a range of different 
senses in which the term ‘standard’ is used in environmental quality management contexts. 
11 Generally see G. Richardson, A. Ogus and P. Burrows, Policing Pollution (1982) 62–64 and D. Vogel, 
National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States (1986) 87–90. 
12 See Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twenty-first Report, Setting Environmental Standards 
(1998) Cm 4053, Annex C, listing a range of European Community directives establishing environmental quality 
standards applicable to different environmental media. 
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quality objectives for mercury discharged by the chloralkali industry.13 The Directive 
has as its purpose ‘to protect the aquatic environment of the Community against pollution 
by certain dangerous substances’. One of the quality objectives set under the 
Directive is a ‘biological standard’ set for fish, so that the concentration of mercury 
in fish flesh is not to exceed 0.3 mg/kg. Despite first impressions, this limit is actually 
set purely to protect the health of human consumers, not to protect fish or the 
aquatic ecosystems of which they form a part.14 This is not to suggest that legislating 
to secure human-centred goals for the environment is never beneficial to its nonhuman 
living constituents, but merely that such benefits tend to be incidental rather 
than purposeful.15 
From a human standpoint, the neglect of the wider environment and its nonhuman 
constituents may not be seen as a serious problem. Certainly, natural landscapes, 
species and habitats, and even parts of the built environment, can be seen as 
worthy of protection because of the aesthetic or cultural value that humans attach to 
them. The essentially utilitarian progression16 of environmental quality law need not 
exclude regulation seeking to secure less tangible cultural benefits. However, historically, 
these things have been placed well down the list of priorities when gauged 
against more pressing concerns about preventing more direct kinds of harm to the 
health or immediate well being of human beings. 
 
2.1 The Challenge of Intrinsic Value 
 
The new challenge arises where elements of the environment and ecosystem are recognised 
to have a value that is not purely dependent upon their capacity to provide 
human benefit. Perhaps the ultimate environmental quality standard is that the environmental 
media should be contaminated by a level of human-produced pollutants 
set at zero.17 In respect of hazardous substances at least, this position seems to be 
13 Directive 82/176/EEC. Another example is to be seen in the interpretation of the Directives concerned 
with waters for freshwater fish (78/659/EEC) and shellfish waters (79/923/EEC). Both Directives have as 
their purpose the protection and improvement of respective waters for ecological and economic reasons. A key 
contrast between the two is that the preamble to the Shellfish Waters Directive explicitly refers to the need for 
protection of shellfish consumers, thereby recognising its human health basis, whereas the Freshwater Fish 
Waters Directive makes no corresponding provision, suggesting that it is directed primarily towards ecological 
objectives. Despite the differences in wording of the Directives, the European Court of Justice has interpreted 
the Freshwater Fish Waters Directive as having a human health purpose simply because the salmonid and 
cyprinid species covered by the Directive may be consumed. Again, it transpires that a directive appearing to 
have a primarily ecological objective is actually intended to secure human-centred purposes that are not apparent 
from its wording. See Case C-298/95 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-6747 and discussion of this 
case in W. Howarth and D. McGillivray, Water Pollution and Water Quality Law (2001) at section 15.3.3. 
14 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Setting Environmental Standards, Twenty-first Report (1998) 
Cm 4053 Annex C para 26. 
15 See the discussion of the ‘comfortable assumption’ that standards devised for human protection are necessarily 
sufficient to protect species and ecosystems, at Section 3.4 below. 
16 On the utilitarian justification for protection of environmental quality generally, see J. Passmore, Man’s 
Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (1974); J.R. Des Jardins, Environmental Ethics: 
An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (4th edn, 2005) particularly Chapters 2 and 4; and I.M. Carr, ‘Saving 
the Environment – does utilitarianism provide a justification?’ Legal Studies (1992) 92. 
17 It might be argued that this standard was envisaged by the Drinking Water Quality Directive (80/778/EEC 
as amended by 98/83/EC) in setting a limit of 0.1 parts per billion for any pesticide in drinking water. This 
low limit was seen as a surrogate zero because it was set beyond the limits of measurability at the time of its 
adoption. See Evidence Submitted by Water UK (Z34) at 162 of Evidence to House of Commons, Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Progress on the Use of Pesticides: The Voluntary Initiative (Eighth Report of 
Session 2004–05, HC 258, 2005). Also see S. Tromans, ‘High Principles and Low Cunning: Putting Environmental 
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accepted as a longer-term objective at a regional international level under the 
OSPAR Convention.18 The OSPAR Hazardous Substances Strategy is particularly ambitious 
in seeking to reduce the concentrations of hazardous substances in the environment 
to near background values for naturally occurring substances and close to 
zero for man-made synthetic substances. Additionally, the strategy requires the parties 
to ‘make every endeavour’ to move to the complete cessation of discharges of 
hazardous substances by 2020.19 Although somewhat aspirational, in not being formulated 
as a strictly binding legal obligation upon the parties, the OSPAR environmental 
quality standard exceeds what is required for purely human benefit and 
reflects the preamble to the Convention: ‘recognising the inherent worth of the 
marine environment’. 
The ‘inherent worth’ position is an endorsement of the need for species and habitats 
to be protected, regardless of any benefit they may bring to the well-being of 
human beings. Whilst, in times gone by, this perspective might have been regarded 
as rather eccentric, it has gained increasing ground as a policy objective. Notably, 
the preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity20 recognises ‘the intrinsic 
value of biological diversity’ alongside the diverse benefits that it brings to human 
beings. The new concern is with variability among living organisms and the ecological 
complexes of which they are a part, and this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems.21 
It is not the purpose of this discussion to revisit the extensive literature on arguments 
for and against the intrinsic value of nature or the philosophical implications 
of the ecocentric position in allocating rights to non-humans.22 The lesser aim is to 
limit the discussion to the legal implications which follow from a recognition of the 
inherent worth of the environment and the ecosystems that it supports. On this, it is 
apparent that purely human-centred objectives for the quality of the environmental 
media have been superseded, or at least supplemented, by the need for diversity of 
species and ecosystems to be maintained and enhanced for their own sake. Moreover, 
in the same way as environmental law has progressed from the negative to the positive, 
from prohibitions to environmental quality standards, it needs to be considered to 
what extent it is feasible for ecological laws, founded upon intrinsic value, to follow a 
similar progression. Certainly, early laws protecting species and habitats have been 
based upon prohibiting the worst kinds of destructive activity impacting upon 
endangered flora and fauna and have paralleled the early approach to pollution law 
Principles Into Legal Practice’ Journal of Planning and Environment Law 779 (1995) at 783, stressing the ‘precautionary’ 
character of the pesticide parameter. 
18 32 ILM 1069 (1993) and see OSPAR website, http://www.ospar.org. 
19 See and OSPAR Hazardous Substances Strategy (1998, and reaffirmed 2003, Reference number: 2003-21) 
available at OSPAR website, http://www.ospar.org. Also see the discussion of the European Community Water 
Framework Directive 2000/60/EC at Section 4 below. 
20 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 31 ILM 818 (1992) and http://www.biodiv.org. For 
general commentary, see L. Glowka et al, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (1994) and Secretariat 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Handbook on the Convention on Biological Diversity (2001) Earthscan. 
21 Art.2 Convention on Biological Diversity, defining ‘biodiversity’. 
22 For useful starting points on these debates see D. Pepper, Modern Environmentalism: An Introduction (1996) 
particularly Chapter 2; A. Light and H. Rolston III (eds), Environmental Ethics: An Anthology (2005) Part III; R. 
Eliot (ed.), Environmental Ethics (1995); J.R. Des Jardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental 
Philosophy (4th edn, 2005); and D. Wilkinson, ‘Using Environmental Ethics to Create Ecological Law’ in 
J. Holder and D. McGillivray (eds), Locality and Identity: Environmental Issues in Law and Society (1999) at 17, for 
a discussion of some of the legal implications of ecocentric valuation. 
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in their negativity.23 The challenge for the next generation of ecological laws is to 
progress from this reactive approach towards securing positive objectives for wildlife 
and ecosystems by legal means. The present focus of attention is upon how this is to 
be done and how ‘ecological quality standards’ might parallel, and interrelate with, 
those standards concerned with the quality of the environmental media. 
 
3. Ecological Quality Standards and Other Kinds of Approach 
 
Although examples of environmental quality standards are now familiar and manifold 
in the UK and European Community legislation, the concept of an ‘ecological 
quality standard’ is less clearly understood, and some observations are needed upon 
the rather uncompromising sense in which the term is used here. 
As has been stated, an environmental quality standard is a scientifically formulated 
and numerically expressed specification of the maximum level of contamination 
that is legally permissible in a given part of the physical environment. As a direct 
counterpart of this, an ecological quality standard should be a statement of the minimum 
acceptable state of ecosystems and their biological components, with a corresponding 
legal obligation that no deterioration below that standard should be 
permissible. Hence, for flora, fauna and habitats, ecological quality standards are 
intended to serve as a mandatory baseline for minimal levels of diversity and abundance, 
specified quantitatively for each component, and backed by legal obligations 
to ensure their realisation. 
It is recognised, however, that the distinction between standards for biotic and abiotic 
components of the overall environment adopted here is not always adhered to. An alternative 
view is that ‘ecological quality standards’ should encompass requirements needed 
for the environmental media as well as the living things dependent upon them. Under 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, for example, an ‘ecosystem’ is defined as ‘a 
dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living 
environment interacting as a functional unit.24 On that basis, ecological quality standards 
should extend to water, air and land quality where these impact upon living things, 
whereas the view is taken here that standards for contamination of environmental media 
are best treated separately, with proper account being taken of impacts of contamination 
upon living things. Assimilation of environmental and ecological standards may be desirable 
in the longer term, but for the present the distinction is usefully maintained to 
emphasise the contrasting issues needing to be addressed in establishing ecological quality 
standards. 
23 Nationally, see Part I Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (extensively amended by the Countryside and 
Rights of Way Act 2000) concerned with the protection of birds, other animals and plants (in part, consolidating 
earlier bird protection legislation) and Part II concerned with protection of Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
and other areas of conservation importance. At European Community level, see the Wild Birds Directive 
(79/409/EEC) and the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC), again largely concerned with the prohibition of various 
kinds of destructive activity. 
24 Art.2 Convention on Biological Diversity, emphasis added. Similarly all-encompassing definitions are 
adopted in environmental science. See R. O. Brooks, R. Jones and R.A. Virginia, Law and Ecology: The Rise of the 
Ecosystem Regime (2002) at 7: ‘Ecology is the study of the relationship of organisms and their environment. The 
environment includes other individuals in its population, other populations of plants and animals with which 
an organism and its population interacts, and the physical and chemical factors that influence life (i.e. the abiotic 
environment)’. 
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Another issue which is far from being resolved is the proper spatial scope of an 
ecological quality standard. As has been observed, 
the scale of analysis and action should be determined by the problem being addressed. It 
could, for example, be a particle of soil, a pond, a forest, a biome or the entire biosphere, and 
it should be recognised that ecosystems exist at all scales and with any chosen boundaries. 
The choice of ecosystem boundaries has important implications on management because 
many important species have distributions which cross ecosystem boundaries, thus making 
management difficult.25 
Although, conveniently for regulatory purposes, the physical environment divides 
itself into water, air and land, and allows environmental quality standards to be specifically 
formulated for each of these media or their subcategories, the counterparts 
for subdivision of ecosystems are less readily apparent. Categorisation of distinct ecosystems 
is necessary for the setting of ecological quality standards, but the categorisation 
process is presently at an early stage of development. Internationally, initial 
emphasis has been placed upon large marine ecosystems, typically areas greater than 
200,000 km2, representing regions having unique hydrographic regimes, submarine 
topography, productivity and trophically dependent populations.26 However, the 
potential for aquatic or terrestrial ecosystems to be more narrowly drawn is unlimited, 
and the issue of defining the extent and character of the area over which a particular 
ecological quality standard should apply is far from being resolved. 
Alongside the issue of the geographical extent of an ecosystem, there is an equally 
problematic issue of how many elements within that ecosystem are to be the subject 
of ecological quality standards. In responding to a request from the OSPAR Commission 
for advice on the formulation of ecological quality objectives, the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea expressed a concern that, over time, the 
number of ecological quality elements and ecological quality objectives could 
increase to become impracticably large. The Council took the view that it was 
important, at least at the commencement of discussion, to focus upon a small 
number of objectives for the state of ecosystems, since the complexity of decision-making 
would increase as the number of objectives increased. Accordingly, it advised 
that a limited number of ecological quality objectives and ecological quality elements 
should be adopted and used as the basis for further work programmes.27 
25 Report of the Study Group on Ecosystem Assessment and Monitoring, Marine Habitat Committee, International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, ICES CM 2000/E:09 Ref.: ACME, 8–12 May 2000, para 5.1(1) available 
at the ICES website, http://www.ices.dk. 
26 Ibid, para 5.1(2). 
27 See ICES, Report of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management and Advisory Committee on Ecosystems, 
2004 (2004) para 2.1.7.1 available on ICES website, http://www.ices.dk. It must be stressed, however, that the 
points were made in the context of establishing ecological quality objectives rather than ecological quality standards 
(see n 10 above on this contrast). In the terminology used by ICES, an ‘ecological quality objective’ is a 
statement of the desired level of ecological quality relevant to a reference level. ‘Ecological quality’ refers to the 
structure and function of the marine ecosystem, taking account of the biological community and natural 
physiographic and climatic factors as well as the physical and chemical conditions including those resulting 
from human activities (see ibid). Similarly, see also the ten ecological quality objectives, with the 21 associated 
ecological quality elements, agreed by the Fifth North Sea Conference, as the basis for a pilot project for the 
North Sea (Bergen Declaration 2002, Annex 3 available at odin.dep.no/md/nsc/). These ecological quality 
objectives are seen by OSPAR as describing a desired level of ecological quality against which the effects of 
human activities can be judged, and against which the effectiveness of measures to achieve a healthy marine 
environment can be assessed. Again, the provisional and aspirational nature of the exercise characterising 
a ‘desired’ state of the marine environment, in terms of ‘ecological quality objectives’ of this kind, contrasts with the 
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Unavoidably, therefore, a degree of selectivity is needed in the initial selection of 
those elements for which ecological quality standards are provided, but this does not 
preclude the progressive expansion of standards to an indefinite number of different 
species and habitat types.28 
 
3.1 Pseudo Ecological Quality Standards 
 
In order to illuminate what ecological quality standards are not, it may be helpful to 
distinguish ecological quality standards from some other approaches to ecological 
management. 
An initial contrast that needs to be drawn is with the use of biological elements as 
‘indicators’ of the general state of the environment and progress towards sustainable 
development. For example, the Biodiversity Strategy for England29 sets out policies and 
objectives for the protection and enhancement of nature, accompanied by ‘headline 
indicators’, intended to give a broad overview of trends, which have since been supplemented 
by further indicators.30 It is envisaged that the success of the Strategy will 
be measured by monitoring information gathered in relation to each of the different 
indicators. For this purpose, populations of wild birds, conditions of sites of special 
scientific interest and the status of certain priority species and habitats, and 
other matters of ecological significance, are monitored to gauge improvements.31 An 
analogous approach has been used by the European Environment Agency which has 
adopted an indicator-based system for its assessment and reporting on the state of 
the European environment and progress towards agreed targets, encompassing indicators 
for biodiversity.32 
Whatever the advantages of using the abundance of particular species or habitats 
to measure periodic progress or regress in biodiversity conservation, it must be 
stressed that ‘indicator’ approaches fall some way short of what is required by ecological 
quality standards. Indicators may allow useful comparisons to be drawn 
between monitoring information and allow a quantified assessment to be made in 
relation to strategic goals, but they do not set precise objectives of what must be 
achieved for any particular kind of biodiversity or impose any legal requirements 
quantified and mandatory form of ecological quality standards as indicated above. Hence, whilst recognition of 
the concept of ecological quality objectives has been identified as a strong point of the OSPAR approach 
towards eutrophication, its weaknesses are that no quantitative criteria have been agreed, and there is no certainty 
that the process will result in such criteria [European Commission, DG Environment, Criteria Used for the 
Definition of Eutrophication in Marine and Coastal Waters (2001) (a report prepared by Environmental Resources 
Management, authors M.M. Gavin, S Borgvang and C. de Meeus) 71–72]. 
28 See Section 4 below on Annex V to the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) which requires assessment 
of the composition and abundance of phytoplankton, aquatic flora, benthic invertebrate fauna and fish 
in relation to the assessment of ecological good status for surface water but avoids the specification of ecological 
quality standards at the level of individual species within these categories. 
29 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Working with the Grain of Nature: A biodiversity Strategy 
for England (2002), available at DEFRA website, http://www.defra.gov.uk. 
30 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, A Biodiversity Strategy for England – Measuring Progress: 
baseline assessment (2003), available at DEFRA website, http://www.defra.gov.uk. 
31 On the use of biological indicators to assess progress towards sustainable development, see Department for 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, Quality of Life Counts: Indicators for a Strategy for the Sustainable Development 
for the United Kingdom: a Baseline Assessment (1999), available at http://www.sustainable-development. 
gov.uk. 
32 See European Environment Agency website on use of indicators, and particular the indicator ‘Cumulated 
area of nationally [nature protection] designated areas over time in (Pan) Europe’, available at http:// 
www.eea.eu.int. 
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in respect of their realisation. Monitoring biodiversity changes is a markedly different 
exercise from being required to secure specified ecological objectives. 
Second, ‘ecological quality objectives’ must be distinguished from other kinds of 
strategic goal of broader or narrower compass. For example, a stated ‘headline’ objective 
of the European Community sustainable development strategy is to halt the loss of 
biodiversity by 2010.33 Although it is laudable to seek a reversal in the trend of deterioration 
of species and habitats and the stabilisation of biodiversity levels by 2010, 
even if this is achieved, it would not necessarily amount to the realisation of a satisfactory 
or acceptable state for species and habitats. Halting deterioration and establishing 
legally binding standards for biodiversity as positive obligations are significantly 
different exercises, since stabilising levels of biodiversity does not necessarily involve 
securing a level of biodiversity that is satisfactory. Likewise, the narrower biodiversity 
objective, for protected areas and species, under the Habitats Directive, of securing 
‘favourable conservation status’34 falls short of an ecological quality standard, even in 
respect of the particular areas and species to which it applies. ‘Favourable conservation 
status’ gives no indication of what particular level of biodiversity or abundance 
needs to be secured, beyond that of a species or habitat maintaining a stable state on 
a long-term basis.35 This leaves open the possibility that a species or habitat could 
meet the favourable conservation status requirement merely by being maintained in 
a stable state, albeit with a historically low population or small area. A ‘stable’ conservation 
status is not necessarily the same thing as a ‘satisfactory’ one, and it is the latter 
rather than the former that ecological quality standards should seek to address. 
In summary, the uncompromising character of ecological quality objectives 
must be recognised. The end point, it must be reaffirmed, is the formulation of 
precise qualitative and quantitative standards for each kind of biodiversity, analogous 
to existing legal obligations in respect of meeting and maintaining quality 
standards for the environmental media. 
 
3.2 Ecological Requirements in Environmental Quality Directives 
 
Another kind of pseudo ecological quality standard is to be seen in the incorporation 
of ecological requirements in legal measures that are primarily concerned with 
33 European Commission, A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development, 
COM(2001) 264 final, available at europa.eu.int. See also the recent consultation on a new strategy, 
commenced in July 2004, which has prompted the criticism that the existing strategy is ‘too vague and lacks a 
real definition and specific objectives, targets and deadlines’ (EurActive, ‘Stakeholders to revive EU’s sustainable 
development strategy’, News Release 14 April 2005, at http://www.euractive.com). 
34 Art.2(2) of the Habitats Directive (92/43/EC) requires measures taken pursuant to the Directive to be 
designed to maintain or restore, at a favourable conservation status, natural habitats and species of wild fauna 
and flora of Community interest. Art.1(a, e and i) of the Directive provides the following definitions. The 
expression ‘conservation status’ means the sum of the influences on a natural habitat and its typical species that 
may affect its long-term natural distribution, structure and function as well as the long-term survival of its typical 
species within the European territory of the Member States. The conservation status of a habitat will be 
‘favourable’ where its natural range, and areas within that range, are stable or increasing; the specific structure 
and functions which are necessary for its long-term maintenance exist and are likely to continue to exist for the 
foreseeable future; and the conservation status of its typical species is ‘favourable’. Similarly, the conservation 
status of a species will be ‘favourable’ when population dynamics data on the species indicated that it is maintaining 
itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of its natural habitats; the natural range of the species 
is neither being reduced nor is likely to be reduced for the foreseeable future; and there is, and will probably 
continue to be, a sufficiently large habitat to maintain its population on a long-term basis. 
35 See the discussion at Section 5.1 below on the dubious status of ecological ‘stability’. 
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environmental quality. Whilst it has been noted that ecological quality standards 
may in the future encompass requirements for the environmental media determined 
by genuine biological needs, this is not evidenced by past ‘backdoor’ attempts 
to legislate for ecological quality in primarily environmental quality measures.36 
In the first place, ascertaining whether a legal measure concerned with the 
environment encompasses ecological concerns is not always straightforward. A 
law against pollution, for example, could be motivated by the need to protect 
human health, to protect the quality of the environmental media, to protect the 
living things dependent on that media, for aesthetic reasons or for any combination 
of these purposes. National legislation is notoriously obscure as to its objectives. 
Parliamentary debates are frequently uninformative or inconsistent, and it is 
a matter of guesswork to ascertain whether, or to what extent, a pollution-control 
measure actually has ecological protection as a part of its rationale. Commendably, 
European Community environmental legislation contrasts with national law 
in that its objectives are expressly stated in preliminary recitals and judicial interpretation 
is undertaken with explicit attention to the purposes of legislation.37 
Hence, a contextual or purposive reading of an ‘environmental’ directive, alongside 
its background and objectives, makes it more readily apparent whether the 
measure is intended purely to protect the quality of the environmental media or 
whether ecological benefits are envisaged. The difficulty, however, with much 
Community environmental legislation is that lip-service seems to be paid to the 
ecological objectives of a measure, but it usually proves to be little more than that. 
Stating that a directive, that is primarily concerned with environmental quality, is 
also intended to provide benefits to species and ecosystems, or the broader ‘environment’ 
as a whole, does not sufficiently clarify the character or extent of the ecological 
protection that is intended or the ecological result to be achieved. 
3.3 Case Study: The Agricultural Nitrates Directive 
The preceding points, about generalised or obscure ecological quality standards in 
environmental quality legislation, are best illustrated by example. Although other 
instances could be chosen,38 a good case study of the use of unsatisfactory ecological 
36 With the possible exception of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), discussed at Section 5 below. 
37 See, for an example from an environmental context, Case C-72/95 Aannemerbedrifj P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and 
Others v Gedeputeerde Staten Van Zuid-Holland [1997] Env LR 265 at para 28, emphasising the need for purposive 
interpretation where there is a disparity between national language versions of a Directive. 
38 Directive 96/62/EC on ambient air quality assessment and management provides another pertinent 
example of ‘obscure’ ecological standards in a non-aquatic context. The Directive seeks to establish a common 
framework for setting objectives for ambient air quality in the Community to avoid, prevent or reduce 
harmful effects on human health and the environment as a whole. Environmental impacts, other than 
human health, are relevant to limit values, represented in a level of air quality, set to avoid, prevent or 
reduce harmful effects on humans and/or the environment. Hence, when setting limit values, account must 
be taken of various criteria including the sensitivity of flora and fauna and their habitats (Annex II). However, 
the mechanisms by which account is to be taken of ecological impacts under secondary directives concerning 
particular contaminants are unclear. See, for example, Directive 1999/30/EC relating to limit 
values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient 
air. This Directive notes that ecosystems should be protected against the adverse effects of sulphur dioxide 
and that vegetation should be protected against the adverse effects of oxides of nitrogen, but there is no 
indication that other pollutants covered by the Directive have any harmful ecological impacts. By way of 
background to the Directive, the European Commission scientific working groups Position Paper of Sulphur 
Dioxide (1997) (at europa.eu.int) also notes the adverse effects of the contaminant on plants, though it is far 
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standards is to be seen in the European Community Agricultural Nitrates Directive.39 
The underlying objective of the Directive is to reduce water pollution caused by 
nitrates from agricultural sources and to prevent further such pollution.40 The initial 
question is the reason why the Community should be seeking to reduce nitrate contamination 
of waters and the implications for ecological quality standards. 
A range of undesirable impacts are recognised by the Directive: 
it is therefore necessary, in order to protect human health and living resources and aquatic 
ecosystems and to safeguard other legitimate uses of water, to reduce water pollution caused 
or induced by nitrates from agricultural sources and to prevent further such pollution...41 
This indicates that four distinct objectives are being pursued: (1) protection of 
human health; (2) protection of living resources; (3) protection of aquatic ecosystems; 
and (4) safeguarding other legitimate uses of water. Notably, however, the 
Directive does not establish any relative priority between these different purposes 
nor does it expressly address the question of whether a water quality standard established 
for one purpose is necessarily appropriate for the others. 
The public health impact of nitrate contamination of water has been a prominent 
feature of previous Community legislation, which requires that water supplied for 
domestic use should not exceed 50 mg/l, with the same threshold imposed as an 
imperative requirement for ‘raw’ water, abstracted for supply after treatment.42 The 
reasons for a precise parameter for nitrate lie in relatively well-documented health 
concerns and the adoption, by the Community, of a precautionary approach to maximum 
levels of nitrate in water originally formulated by the World Health Organisation. 
43 It is not surprising, therefore, that the same parameter for nitrate should be 
adopted in the Nitrates Directive, insofar as its objectives encompass the protection 
of public health. What is less clear is what parameter for nitrate is needed to meet 
the ecological objectives of the Directive. 
The mechanisms of the Nitrates Directive involve, amongst other things, the designation 
of nitrate-vulnerable zones, comprising areas of land which drain into certain 
polluted or vulnerable waters and which contribute to, or potentially contribute to, 
nitrate pollution. Designation of areas is determined by three criteria: (1) whether 
from clear how the recognised adverse impacts upon plants are reflected in the numerical threshold value for 
sulphur dioxide that is proposed or adopted in the Sulphur Dioxide Directive. As with the Agricultural Nitrates 
Directive, the inference that is indicated is that the ambient air quality legislation is heavily orientated towards 
human health impacts and covers ecological impacts in only a cursory and imprecise manner. 
39 Directive 91/67/EEC and generally see, European Commission, The Implementation of Council Directive 91/ 
676/EEC Concerning the Protection of Waters Against Pollution Caused by Nitrates from Agricultural Sources, 
COM(2002)407, available at europa.eu.int. 
40 Art.1 Agricultural Nitrates Directive. 
41 Recital 6 Agricultural Nitrates Directive. 
42 Drinking Water Quality Directive (80/778/EEC, subsequently amended by 98/83/EC) Annex 1 
parameter n.20. ‘Raw water’ abstracted for supply purposes, after treatment, is subject to the Drinking 
Water Abstraction Directive (75/440/EEC, as amended by 79/869/EEC) which imposes the same parameter 
for nitrate in respect of water which is subject to normal physical treatment, chemical treatment and 
disinfection before supply (Annex I parameter n.7). 
43 Concerns about methaemoglobaemia or ‘blue baby syndrome’ and gastric cancer were identified by the 
World Health Organisation [World Health Organisation, European Standards for Drinking Water (1970) and 
(1971)]. Although reservations were expressed as to whether the parameters established by the Drinking 
Water Directive were genuinely needed to safeguard health by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 
Sixteenth Report, Freshwater Quality (1992) para 7.127. Generally see S. Elworthy, Farming for Drinking 
Water (1994). 
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surface waters contain more nitrate than the concentration allowed by the Drinking 
Water Abstraction Directive;44 (2) whether ground waters contain more than 50 
mg/l nitrates; and (3) whether natural freshwater lakes or other bodies, estuaries, 
coastal waters and marine waters are found to be ‘eutrophic’.45 
Notably, the three criteria for designation of nitrate-vulnerable zones reveal significantly 
different underlying concerns justifying the imposition of restrictions upon land 
use. The first two categories apply the same parameter, 50 mg/l of nitrate, as a basis for 
designation of surface waters or ground waters. Since the parameter had been previously 
used as a public health standard for drinking water, it might be thought that the 
standard should only be applied to waters intended for that purpose. However, this is 
not the case, since the first two categories concern all surface and ground waters, not 
merely those that are to be used for water supply purposes.46 It appears that a water quality 
standard, formulated for the specific purpose of protecting public health, has been 
translated into a standard that needs to be applied to all waters within the scope of the 
Directive, even where public health issues are not directly relevant. For certain waters, 
therefore, it appears that a public health standard is being adopted either for the protection 
of the ecological quality of waters or to safeguard other legitimate uses of water. 
The third criterion, listed above, for designation of nitrate-vulnerable zones is 
motivated by more directly ecological concerns. For the purposes of the Directive, 
‘eutrophication’ means the enrichment of water by nitrogen compounds, 
causing an accelerated growth of algae and higher forms of plant life to produce 
an undesirable disturbance to the balance of organisms present in the water and 
to the quality of the water concerned.47 Naturally, waters range between oligotrophic 
(nutrient poor) and eutrophic (nutrient rich) and support distinctive 
communities of flora and fauna specially adapted to the particular trophic state 
of a kind of water. In an uncontaminated state, water will be in trophic balance, 
as between the input of nutrients and their uptake by flora. However, the addition 
of further nutrients to the water, commonly from agricultural activities or 
the discharge of sewage effluent, disturbs this equilibrium. Although a limited 
addition of nutrients may enhance the plant and animal diversity in a water,48 in 
44 Directive 75/440/EEC. 
45 Art.3(1) and Annex IA Agricultural Nitrates Directive. 
46 Case C-69/99, Commission v United Kingdom [2000] ECR I-10979. 
47 Art.2(1) Agricultural Nitrates Directive. See also the OSPAR, Strategy on Eutrophication (1998 revised and 
reaffirmed 2003, Reference number: 2003-21) which defines ‘eutrophication’ as ‘the enrichment of water by 
nutrients causing an accelerated growth of algae and higher forms of plant life to produce an undesirable disturbance 
to the balance of organisms present in the water and to the quality of the water concerned, and therefore 
refers to the undesirable effects resulting from anthropogenic enrichment by nutrients as described in the 
Common Procedure’ to assess and classify eutrophication status on a common basis. The overall objective of 
the Strategy is ‘to combat eutrophication in the OSPAR maritime area, in order to achieve and maintain a 
healthy marine environment where eutrophication does not occur’, with this being achieved by 2010. On 
progress towards this objective, see OSPAR Integrated Report 2003 on the Eutrophication Status of the OSPAR Maritime 
Area Based Upon the First Application of the Comprehensive Procedure (2003); Ecological Quality Objectives for the 
Greater North Sea with Regard to Nutrients and Eutrophication Effects (2005); and Common Procedure for the Identification 
of the Eutrophication Status of the OSPAR Maritime Area (Reference number: 2005-3). See OSPAR website 
http://www.ospar.org. 
48 See Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twelfth Report, Managing Waste: The Duty of Care 
(1985) Cmnd 9675 para 7.49, but contrast Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution Sixteenth Report, 
Freshwater Quality (1992) Cm 1966 paras 3.8 and 2.18. Similarly, it has been noted that, ‘at a theoretical level, it 
is possible that species diversity may not respond consistently to eutrophication—eutrophication in an oligotrophic 
system might conceivably result in an increase in species diversity, while eutrophication at higher ambient 
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extreme cases, of eutrophic or hypertrophic waters, excessive algal growth may 
cause oxygen levels to fluctuate to such a degree that diversity of animal and 
plant life declines. In such a state, the conditions may favour the growth of 
potentially toxic cyanobacteria, commonly called ‘blue-green algae’, with consequent 
deterioration of the amenity value and potential uses of the water.49 
Eutrophication is the ecological phenomenon that the Directive seeks to avoid 
insofar as it produces an undesirable disturbance to the balance of the organisms 
present and the quality of the waters. However, the issue of what kind and degree of 
disturbance should be considered ‘undesirable’ is unspecified and seems to require 
an intricate ecological value judgment to be made. The reasons for the seemingly 
evasive approach towards ecological quality criteria under the Directive appear to lie 
in the lack of a consensus as to what level of protection is actually needed for living 
resources and aquatic ecosystems. 
Even the supposed harm of ‘eutrophication’ is conceptually problematic.50 Although 
the phenomenon is an important ecological concern, it is difficult to relate it directly to 
any precise water quality parameter since the adverse effect of any concentration of a 
particular nutrient is so greatly dependent upon the characteristics of the receiving 
waters in what is supposed to be their uncontaminated state. A small amount of nutrient 
addition to an oligotrophic water may have a highly damaging effect on a rare species 
of aquatic flora and fauna, whereas a relatively large amount of nutrient may have 
little effect upon water that is already naturally eutrophic. Hence it has been observed: 
eutrophication describes a process rather than a state and studies have shown that it is controlled 
by a number of factors. These include nutrients, flow rate of waters, shading and turbidity, 
depth, temperature and turbulence. The relationship of many of these factors to 
eutrophication is not easily quantified. The assessment of whether a stretch of water actually 
or potentially is eutrophic is not possible simply by reference to numeric chemical criteria. 
A number of symptoms should be considered in order to come to a judgement as to 
whether an individual stretch of water is suffering or likely to suffer from eutrophication. 
The importance of particular symptoms will depend on local circumstances.51 
nutrient concentrations may reduce it. Changes in species diversity are the sum of many effects, and eutrophication 
can rarely be assumed to occur in isolation from other anthropogenic factors’ (European Commission, 
DG Environment, Criteria Used for the Definition of Eutrophication in Marine and Coastal Waters (2001) at x). 
49 See National Rivers Authority, Toxic Blue-Green Algae (1990) and B. Moss, J. Madgwick and G. Phillips, A 
Guide to the Restoration of Nutrient-Enriched Shallow Lakes (1996). 
50 See European Commission, DG Environment, Criteria Used for the Definition of Eutrophication in Marine and 
Coastal Waters (2001). This report provides a review of the different existing criteria used by European Community 
Member States to define ‘eutrophication’ and provides suggestions for the common criteria and indicators 
that should be used. The report emphasises important distinctions (and potential confusions) between the 
process of ‘eutrophication’, and its causative factors and symptoms and consequences. 
51 Government Response to Consultation on Criteria and Procedures for Identifying Sensitive Areas and Less Sensitive 
Areas (Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive) and “Polluted Waters” (Nitrates Directive) in England and Wales (incorporated 
in DoE, MAFF and WO, Methodology for Identifying Sensitive Areas (Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive) 
and Methodology for Designating Vulnerable Zones (Nitrates Directive) in England and Wales (1993) Annex B para 9. 
Similarly, it has been observed that ‘the most important implication [for criteria for ‘eutrophication’] is that it 
is impossible to regard formulations of the form ‘an increase of x grams of algae per square metre’ or of ‘y 
grams of chlorophyll per litre’, as some defining boundary which, when passed, becomes eutrophication. 
Eutrophication can occur anywhere on a continuum from low oligotrophic to extreme hypertrophic, and small 
absolute changes at the oligotrophic end of the spectrum may nevertheless have a very significant impact. As we 
know, although some sophisticated methods such as algal bioassays have been developed in some countries, 
there is no ‘standard’ universal measurement in Europe’ (European Commission, DG Environment, Criteria 
Used for the Definition of Eutrophication in Marine and Coastal Waters (2001) at 5). 
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Implicitly, therefore, some national scepticism existed as to whether environmental 
quality law possessed the subtlety to recognise the variable sensitivity of different 
waters to nutrient enrichment, given the inappropriateness of any absolute or comprehensive 
way of characterising the process of ‘eutrophication’. 
The European Court of Justice recently had to grapple with the concept of 
‘eutrophication’ in proceedings against France under the Urban Waste Water Treatment 
Directive.52 This Directive makes comparable provision to the Agricultural 
Nitrates Directive, in requiring the designation of sensitive areas in respect of the 
eutrophication of waters by nitrogen and/or phosphorous arising from discharges 
of urban wastewater. The Commission’s complaint was that France had failed to 
identify the waters and designate the sensitive areas in respect of eutrophication 
where sewerage infrastructure improvements were needed. Under both directives, 
the definition of ‘eutrophication’ is similarly formulated. In the context of urban 
wastewater treatment, the Court characterised ‘eutrophication’ as the confluence of 
four criteria: (1) the enrichment of water by nutrients; (2) the accelerated growth of 
algae and higher forms of plant life; (3) an undesirable disturbance of the balance 
of organisms present in the water; and (4) a deterioration of the quality of the water.53 
The critical difficulty lies in showing that the level of enrichment that takes place is 
‘undesirable’ and, as the Court emphasised, that this encompasses significant harmful 
effects not only upon flora and fauna, but also upon humans, the soil, water, air 
or landscape.54 Specifically, changes in the abundance of species involving loss of ecosystem 
biodiversity, nuisances due to the proliferation of opportunistic macroalgae 
and severe outbreaks of toxic or harmful phytoplankton constitute an ‘undesirable’ 
disturbance of the balance of organisms present in the water.55 ‘Deterioration’ entails 
a reduction in the quality of the water which produces harmful effects for ecosystems, 
but also deterioration in the colour, appearance, taste or odour or any other change 
which prevents or limits water uses such as tourism, fishing, fish farming, shellfish 
farming, abstraction of drinking water or cooling of industrial installations.56 Applying 
a precautionary approach57 to the causal link between nutrient inputs and the 
observed states of the waters under consideration, the Court found that France had 
failed to designate the waters as sensitive for the purposes of the Directive. 
Despite the insights provided by this judgment, the continuing problem is that identification 
of ecological quality standards under both the Agricultural Nitrates Directive 
and the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive remains obscure. The guiding criterion 
remains that of a ‘significant undesirable deterioration’ affecting flora, fauna and 
ecosystems.58 By contrast with the precisely expressed numerical standard for public 
52 91/271/EEC and Case C-280/02 Commission v France [2004] All ER (D) 142 (Sep). See also, Case C-258/ 
00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-5959. 
53 Case C-280/02 Commission v France [2004] All ER (D) 142 (Sep) para 18. 
54 Ibid, para 22. 
55 Ibid, para 23. 
56 Ibid, para 24. 
57 Ibid, para 34. 
58 As it has been observed ‘most, perhaps all, EU marine waters have been subject to eutrophication over a 
period of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years. For EU waters the question ‘has eutrophication occurred?’ 
may therefore be fairly simply answered ‘yes’. The question of interest is really, ‘has unacceptable eutrophication 
occurred’; this cannot be answered by appeal to ‘science’ or fact alone’ (emphasis added) [European 
Commission, DG Environment, Criteria Used for the Definition of Eutrophication in Marine and Coastal Waters 
(2001) at 30]. 
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health, the vague negativity generated by a lack of any ecological quality standards 
required by these directives is striking. 
In summary, the ecological elements of the Agricultural Nitrates Directive suffer from 
over-ambitious intentions and lack of attention to the difficulties of implementation. Ecological 
concerns are ‘tagged on’ to a directive that is primarily concerned with public 
health issues and, whereas public health standards are fairly precisely stipulated, the ecological 
and other aims of the Directive leave ascertainment of corresponding water quality 
standards as a matter of guesswork. 
Although purporting to be adopted for various purposes, the Agricultural Nitrates 
Directive adopts a generalised or obscure treatment of ecological quality standards. 
Although there is no reason to suppose that the standards needed to protect species and 
ecosystems are the same as those which are needed to protect human health, no indication 
is given as to what approach is needed where there is a disparity. Probably, as a consequence 
of the relative lack of scientific information about many kinds of ecological 
impact, the underlying assumption seems to be that human health standards will necessarily 
be good enough to meet ecological requirements. 
Although accepting the technical difficulties, and simple lack of adequate knowledge 
about the living natural environment, enacting obscure ecological requirements 
into legislation is not an adequate response to the impacts of unsatisfactory 
environmental quality upon the non-human parts of the environment. An observation 
of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution deserves reiteration: 
Despite the great difficulties involved, determining dose-effect relationships for the effects of 
substances on the natural environment is an essential exercise if appropriate environmental 
policies are to be adopted. When environmental policies or standards are adopted, it should 
always be made clear in an explicit statement whether they are designed to protect the natural 
environment, human health, or both, and the degree and nature of the protection that 
they are intended to afford.59 
The failure to take heed of this sound advice has resulted in the unsatisfactory provision 
for ecological protection. More generally, it may have served to foster a complacent 
belief that environmental quality law is formulated with sufficient stringency 
to meet any kind of ecological requirement. 
 
3.4 The Comfortable Assumption Discredited 
 
The comfortable assumption that environmental quality standards are necessarily sufficient 
to meet ecological needs is challenged by the opinion of Advocate General 
Van Gerven in the Marismas de Santonia case.60 The circumstances of the case concerned 
Spain’s failure to designate an ornithologically important area as a special protection 
area, under the European Community Wild Birds Directive, and the failure to take 
sufficient protection measures against pollution or deterioration of the habitat.61 The 
various complaints raised by the Commission included an allegation that the discharge 
59 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Setting Environmental Standards, Twenty-first Report (1998) 
Cm 4053 para 2.50. 
60 Case C-355/90 Commission v Spain Opinion of Advocate General Van Gervan [1993] ECR I-4221. 
61 Wild Birds Directive (79/409/EEC) Art.4, concerning special conservation measures for Annex I species 
and migratory birds, and the need to avoid pollution and deterioration of habitats in protected areas and to 
‘strive to’ avoid this in areas outside protected areas. 
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of wastewater into the area had damaging impacts because it contained toxic substances 
that were highly detrimental to the ecological conditions of the site. It was contended 
that the effluent would have adverse effects on species of birds as a result of changes in 
the plankton, algae and invertebrates that provided food for bird species.62 
In its defence, the Spanish Government maintained that no Community measure 
concerning the quality of water had been shown to have been infringed. Although 
the veracity of this assertion was contested by the Commission, the Advocate General’s 
opinion was that, as a matter of principle, conformity with Community water 
legislation did not prevent the wastewater discharges constituting ‘pollution of habitats’ 
for the purposes of the Wild Birds Directive.63 Although more concisely stated, 
the Court of Justice seemed to accept this reasoning in emphasising that detriment 
to the ecological conditions was the critical issue, rather than conformity with environmental 
quality legislation.64 
The inference to be drawn from these observations is that the obligations upon 
Member States in respect of protecting ecologically designated areas may actually be 
stricter than obligations that arise under general environmental quality legislation. 
Hence, meeting Community requirements for air and water quality, and waste management, 
may not be sufficient where adverse impacts upon protected areas are 
identified. Certainly, the observations that have been noted were made in relation to 
the protection of an area of special ornithological significance, and the need to 
avoid pollution and deterioration of habitats outside protected areas may not be so 
strictly construed. Nonetheless, the observations demonstrate the need for caution 
in assuming that an environmental quality standard is sufficiently stringent to meet 
ecological protection purposes or to serve as an ecological quality standard. Put 
another way, conservation law may sometimes have an anti-pollution dimension that 
is stricter than that provided for in environmental quality legislation. 
With the comfortable assumption discredited, the need for explicit and determinate 
ecological quality standards, as opposed to obscure ecological requirements in 
environmental quality directives, becomes all the more pressing. The present focus 
of attention in this respect is the European Community Water Framework Directive. 
 
4. The Water Framework Directive 
 
The furthest point presently reached in the progression towards ecological quality 
standards lies in the European Community Water Framework Directive.65 Alongside 
62 [1993] ECR I-4221 para 51. 
63 Ibid, paras 53 and 54. 
64 Ibid, paras 52 and 53. 
65 For general academic literature on the Water Framework Directive see D. Matthews, ‘The Framework Directive 
on Community Water Policy: A New Approach for EC Environmental Law’ Yearbook of European Law (1997) at 
191; W. Howarth, ‘Accommodation Without Resolution? Emission Controls and Environmental Quality Objectives 
in the Proposed EC Water Framework Directive’ Environmental Law Review (1999) at 6; D. Grimeaud, 
‘Reforming EU Water Law: Towards Sustainability’ European Environmental Law Review (2001) pp 41–51, 88–97 
and 125–135; A. Farmer, ‘The EC Water Framework Directive’ Water Law (2001) at 40; G. Kallis and D. Butler, 
‘The EU Water Framework Directive: Measures and Implications’ Water Policy (2001) at 125; W. Howarth and D. 
McGillivray, Water Pollution and Water Quality Law (2001) Chapter 5. From the perspective of environmental nongovernmental 
organisations, see World Wide Fund for Nature and European Environmental Bureau, ‘Tips and 
Tricks’ for Water Framework Directive Implementation (2004), available at http://www.eeb.org. 
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its importance in comprehensively updating and integrating previous Community 
water legislation, the Directive also introduces some radical innovations in the sustainable 
management of the aquatic environment. Most notably for the present discussion, 
it provides the foremost example of a Community measure explicitly 
requiring precise ecological criteria to be formulated to determine what should 
count as a satisfactory biological state of aquatic quality.66 
 
4.1 The Ecological Good Status Requirement 
 
Setting aside discussion of the intricate legal and administrative details and complex 
scientific tasks that are involved in securing ‘good water status’67 of all relevant waters 
by 2015, the main concern here is with the ecological requirements that underlie the 
Water Framework Directive and the general approach towards ecological quality standards 
that is adopted. Whilst previous attempts to legislate for surface water quality at 
Community level have focused upon physical and chemical parameters, the Directive 
takes an ambitious step beyond this in seeking to characterise water quality in explicit 
and precise ecological terms which form a part of the ‘good status’ requirement for 
surface waters within its scope. Recognising that the Directive is primarily focused 
upon environmental quality, it is clear that it incorporates elements that come closer 
to ecological quality standards than anything previously seen in Community law. 
So far as surface waters are concerned, the Directive stipulates that ‘good surface water 
status’ means the status achieved when both its ecological status and its chemical status68 
are at least good.69 ‘Good ecological status’ is the status of a body of surface water when so 
classified in accordance with Annex V to the Directive.70 The crucially important Annex 
V provides the mechanism for assessing the ecological status of any surface water. 
Broadly, the approach taken is to set out, for each kind of water, what would be expected 
for that water to be classified as having a particular quality status according to a range of 
ecological parameters. Hence, in relation to different kinds of water, the composition 
and abundance of phytoplankton, aquatic flora, benthic invertebrate fauna and fish 
need to be assessed. Essentially, the approach is that of characterising a paradigm of each 
type of water and stipulating features of its biological and hydromorphological quality 
which must be met by actual waters to satisfy a particular ecological quality classification. 
The exercise of applying Annex V to the Directive in practice is of considerable 
technical complexity, given the range of water categories that are involved and the 
diverse range of parameters that need to be taken into account in determining the 
status of any particular water. This is clearly an undertaking, demanding a high level 
66 Although see the Proposed Ecological Quality of Water Directive COM(93) 680 final, which, though abandoned, 
can be seen as a precursor of ecological measures incorporated in the Water Framework Directive. 
67 The point may fairly be made that ‘good status’ is a somewhat ambiguous requirement which may serve as 
an aspiration rather than a mandatory obligation because of the range of exceptions and qualifications which 
are allowed in relation to its realisation. The main exceptions relate to artificial and heavily modified surface 
waters, phased achievement of objectives, less stringent environmental objectives, temporary deterioration of 
water status, and new modifications of physical characteristics and sustainable development activities (see 
Art.5(4) to (8) Water Framework Directive). The cumulative effect of these exceptions may be that there are 
actually quite extensive bodies of waters to which the good status requirement will not be fully applicable. 
68 ‘Good chemical status’ is achieved where the environmental objectives of the Directive are met, so that 
environmental quality standards (established under Annex IX to the Directive) standards for priority substances 
(under Art.16(7) and Annex X) and other relevant environmental standards are realised (Art.2(24)). 
69 Art.2(18) Water Framework Directive. 
70 Art.2(22) Water Framework Directive. 
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of coordinated scientific expertise and common understanding across the Member 
States.71 
On this, it is notable that the European Commission is taking an active role in providing 
guidance to Member States as to the correct approach to be taken in national 
practice pursuant to a Common Implementation Strategy. This involves the establishment 
of a range of specialist groups, Expert Advisory Forums, bringing together 
national experts from the Member States, to provide a series of guidance documents 
formulated at Community level. This pooling of expertise is seen as vitally important 
as a means of securing consensus on issues such as the common approach to ecological 
classification across the Community.72 Further to assist this endeavour, Member 
States are engaged in an ‘intercalibration’ exercise comparing sites in different 
Member States.73 The results of this exercise will be evaluated to ensure that the 
requirements for good status are consistently applied across different Member 
States. Hence, final detailed criteria for ecological good status await the outcome of 
the intercalibration exercise.74 
 
4.2 High Status and ‘Minimal Anthropogenic Alteration’ 
 
Although most of the substantive environmental objectives of the Water Framework 
Directive are concerned with the achievement of good status for particular waters, it 
is significant that Annex V to the Directive is concerned with the classification of 
waters into several different ecological quality categories. Hence, it lists the requirements 
for water to be placed under four classifications, respectively termed ‘high’, 
‘good’, ‘moderate’ and ‘bad’ (for all waters below moderate status). This classification 
system is particularly revealing in what it shows about the ecological valuation 
criteria underlying the Directive. 
In short, ecological valuation is measured according to the degree to which biological 
elements show ‘levels of distortion’ resulting from human activity. Hence, 
good ecological status will be established only where biological elements deviate 
from undisturbed conditions ‘only slightly’. As a general matter, ‘high’ status is 
established where (amongst other things) 
There are no, or only very minor, anthropogenic alterations to the values of the physicochemical 
and hydromorphological elements for the surface water body type from those 
normally associated with that type under undisturbed conditions. 
71 Generally see European Commission website, europa.eu.int/comm/environment/water/water-framework/ 
implementation.html. 
72 Generally see European Commission, Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (2000/ 
60/EC): Strategic Document (2001) and on ecological classification see Guidance Document No 13: Overall Approach 
to the Classification of Ecological Status and Ecological Potential (2005), available at forum.europa.eu.int/Public/ 
irc/env/wfd/library. 
73 Para 1.4.1 Annex V Water Framework Directive requires the results of the intercalibration exercise to be 
published by the Commission with 6 years of the entry into force of the Directive (22 December 2006). See 
Common Implementation Strategy, Guidance Document No 6: Towards a Guidance on Establishment of the Intercalibration 
Network and the Process of the Intercalibration Exercise (2003) and Guidance Document No 14: Guidance on the 
Intercalibration Process 2004–2006 (2005). The UK is participating in the exercise through the Ribble Pilot River 
Basin Project, see http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/regions/northwest/501317/. 
74 Until common criteria for ecological status are determined at Community level, national guidelines have 
been adopted for this purpose. See Water Framework Directive United Kingdom Technical Advisory Group, 
guidance http://www.wfduk.org/tag_guidance/. 
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The values of the biological quality elements for the surface water body reflect those normally 
associated with that type of water under undisturbed conditions, and show no, or only 
very minor, evidence of distortion.75 
Similarly, in respect of ‘fish fauna’, the high-status category is defined as follows: 
Species composition and abundance correspond totally or nearly totally to undisturbed 
conditions. 
All the type-specific disturbance-sensitive species are present. 
The age structures of the fish communities show little sign of anthropogenic disturbance 
and are not indicative of a failure in the reproduction or development of any particular species.76 
For a range of other ecological characteristics, a similar formula is followed. 
Hence, the foremost objective, so far as ecological quality of water is concerned, is 
that of securing or maintaining ‘undisturbed conditions’ or ‘minimal anthropogenic 
alteration’. Apparently, the underlying value premise is that the ‘best’ aquatic environments 
are those where there is no evidence of human impact to be found. Minimal 
anthropogenic impact or ‘back to nature’, as it may be dubbed, seems to be the 
ultimate strategic goal for aquatic ecosystems. 
Minimal anthropogenic impact, as the ultimate ecological objective underlying the 
Water Framework Directive, has not been formulated in isolation from other developments. 
As has been seen, a comparable line of thought is to be discerned in the OSPAR 
Strategy on Hazardous Substances, which has the ultimate aim of achieving concentrations 
of naturally occurring substances in the environment near background, or natural, 
levels and close to zero for man-made synthetic substances.77 Implicitly, the OSPAR 
environmental quality goal for the marine environment is one where the presence of 
contamination, by either natural or manufactured substances, corresponds to a state of 
minimal anthropogenic impact. The Water Framework Directive takes this approach a 
step further in applying a comparable strategy to the ecological quality status of waters 
within its scope. The difficulty with this is that the ‘baseline’ of zero contamination can 
be fairly clearly drawn in an environmental quality context, but it is less clear what state 
should serve as a corresponding baseline for ecological quality purposes. 
 
4.3 The Implications of ‘Minimal Anthropogenic Impact’ 
 
Although most of the key obligations under the Water Framework Directive concern 
mechanisms to secure good status, rather than high status, there is a general obligation 
to maintain the high status of those waters that are so classified. This arises from 
the obligation upon Member States generally to prevent a deterioration of the status 
classification of waters.78 Hence, those waters that are found to be of high status must 
be retained at that standard, and actions likely to cause the naturalness of these 
waters to be compromised may only be authorised under stringent conditions.79 
To that extent, maintaining minimal anthropogenic impact is a legally binding 
obligation. 
75 Para 1.2 Annex V Water Framework Directive. 
76 Para 1.2.1 Annex V Water Framework Directive. 
77 OSPAR, Strategy on Hazardous Substances (1998, revised and reaffirmed 2003, Reference number 2003-21) 
available at OSPAR website, http://www.ospar.org, and discussed at Section 4 above. 
78 Art.4(1)(a)(i) Water Framework Directive. 
79 Art.4(7) Water Framework Directive. 
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Securing and maintaining minimal anthropogenic impact or ‘naturalness’, as an 
ecological goal underlying the Water Framework Directive, has far-reaching implications 
for regulatory priorities in respect of those activities that may adversely impact 
upon the aquatic environment. In some spheres, the impacts are fairly clear. In 
respect of chemical contamination of waters, for example, waters will have to meet 
the environmental objectives of the Directive. This means that ‘programmes of measures’ 
80 will need to be put in place to ensure that effluent discharges and diffuse 
sources of pollution do not allow water quality parameters to be exceeded in receiving 
waters. Where maintenance of high status of waters is involved, restrictions of 
this kind will need to be especially stringent. 
In respect of ecological status, however, the implications of what needs to be done 
to fulfil the requirements of the Directive are less clear. One revealing illustration is 
to be seen in the Directive’s treatment of hydromorphological conditions that prevent 
the ecological status requirements of the Directive being achieved. Although 
the precise meaning of ‘hydromorphological conditions’ is not defined in the Directive, 
it seems to be particularly relevant to situations where the required ecological 
status of a watercourse is not being met because of some change in the physical state, 
or pattern of flow, of waters brought about by human intervention. Typically, this 
might arise where a river has suffered an adverse ecological impact through 
impoundment or abstraction of waters, or through insensitive flood defence activities 
that have resulted in ‘canalisation’ and consequent habitat deterioration for 
aquatic species. 
Programmes of measures must include actions to address significant adverse 
impacts, and these must include measures to ensure that the hydromorphological 
conditions of waters are consistent with the achievement of the ecological quality 
required by the Directive.81 In blunt terms, this seems to mean that where a watercourse 
has been physically modified to such an extent that it fails to meet the 
requirements of ecological ‘good status’, something should be done to address that 
failing. 
An initial inference might be that the worst effects of hydromorphological modification, 
such as where a major infrastructure project for water supply, hydroelectricity 
or flood defence, at immense cost, should be required to be removed to enable 
the ecological objectives of the Directive to be fulfilled. The reality, however, is that 
this is unlikely to happen because major physical modifications of this kind may 
allow such waters to be classified as ‘artificial or heavily modified’.82 The effect of this 
will be that a lesser ecological requirement will need to be met. Rather than achieving 
ecological good status, such water will only need to meet the lower standard of 
‘ecological good potential’. Within quite broad limits, the Directive recognises that 
where waters have been adversely affected by past activities, exceptions must be 
allowed where reversal of past impacts will not be feasible or would be disproportionately 
expensive. Nonetheless, accepting that damage to the hydromorphology of a surface 
water cannot feasibly be undone in many instances, the Directive requires the highest 
80 Art.11 Water Framework Directive. 
81 Art.13(3)(i) Water Framework Directive. 
82 Under Art.4(1)(a)(iii) Water Framework Directive and see Common Implementation Strategy, Guidance 
Document No 4: Identification and Designation of Heavily Modified and Artificial Water Bodies (2003), available at 
forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/env/wfd/library. 
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possible ecological status to be achieved that is consistent with impacts that could 
not reasonably have been avoided due to the nature of the human activity.83 
For future projects, however, the Directive envisages an increasing stringency being 
applied in authorisation procedures for projects capable of having an adverse impact 
on the hydromorphology of surface waters. Hence, it will need to be shown that future 
projects which involve the modification of the physical characteristics of a surface 
water are justified according to a series of requirements. These require it to be shown 
that a modification is of ‘overriding public interest’,84 in terms of human health or 
safety, or sustainable development, and that the benefits of the project cannot feasibly 
be achieved by other means.85 Not before time perhaps, the ecological impacts of 
development projects upon waters will need to be fully evaluated against precise criteria 




There are three general kinds of reservation that need to be expressed about the 
approach towards ecological quality standards taken in the Water Framework Directive. 
The first is the concern that ecological quality standards may be set at a level 
that takes insufficient account of natural variability and are incapable of realisation. 
The second is the issue of whether ‘naturalness’ is a realistic benchmark for setting 
ecological standards in the first place. Third, is the profound and intractable problem 
of how ecological quality standards should take account of human beings as 
components of ecosystems. 
5.1 The Achievability of Ecological Standards 
As the geological history of ecosystems reminds us, the living species that now exist 
are only a minute proportion of those that have previously existed and are now 
extinct.87 Whilst recognising the present role of human impacts in generating 
83 Art.4(5)(b) Water Framework Directive. 
84 Note that the concept of imperative reasons of ‘overriding public interest’ has previously been used in the 
Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) as a basis for allowing proportionate derogation from obligations in respect of 
protected sites [under Art.6(4)] and the protection of species from derogation (under Art.16). In relation to 
Art.6, the European Commission has provided guidance on its interpretation, European Commission, Managing 
Natura 2000 Sites: The Provisions of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EC (2000) at 44. On the national 
interpretation of ‘overriding public interest’ see J. Holder, ‘Overriding Public Interest in Planning and Conservation 
Law’, Journal of Environmental Law (2004) at 401 (commenting on In Newsum and Others v Welsh Assembly 
Government [2004] EWHC 50 (Admin), but see also reversal of this decision by the Court of Appeal in [2004] 
EWCA (Civ) 1565. 
85 Art.4(7) Water Framework Directive. 
86 The point may be fairly noted that ecological impacts may constitute ‘significant effects on the environment’ 
in relation to public or private development projects that fall within the scope of the Environmental 
Assessment Directive (85/337/EEC as amended by 97/11EC). This requires an identification of the direct and 
indirect effects of a project on fauna and flora, amongst other things (Art.3) and that information about such 
impacts should be taken into consideration in the development consent procedure (Art.8). However, the 
Directive provides no explicit or precise criteria as to what impacts are to count as ‘significant’ or what substantive 
consequences follow from this. Generally see J. Treweek, Ecological Impact Assessment (1999); S. Tromans 
and K. Fuller, Environmental Impact Assessment – Law and Practice (2003); and J. Holder, Environmental Assessment: 
The Regulation of Decision Making (2004). By comparison, the requirements of the Water Framework Directive 
are considerably more specific and more demanding, particularly in relation to waters of high ecological status. 
87 E.O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (1992) particularly Chapter 10. 
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threats to the survival of many existing species, the natural phenomenon of species 
being extinguished and new species coming into existence should not be overlooked, 
nor should the constant readjustment of balances between different species 
and their ecosystems. What might be perceived as a static situation is, in reality, a 
dynamic and inherently unstable ecological progression in which the impact of 
human activities is only one amongst many factors affecting the continually changing 
relationships between species. 
There can be no dispute that a belief in a ‘balance of nature’ is a deep-seated paradigm 
in the history of western thought,88 which has a compelling simplicity. Classically 
stated, 
Nature, left undisturbed, so fashions her territory as to give it almost unchanging permanence 
of form, outline and proportion... In countries untrodden by man ... the geographical 
conditions may be regarded as constant and immutable.89 
However, the idea that nature, free from human interference, adheres to the 
unshifting equilibrium that is suggested by the paradigm has become increasingly difficult 
to reconcile with the mounting body of ecological evidence, suggesting dramatic 
oscillations in populations of species for reasons that may have no necessary connection 
with human interference. As a relatively early ecological scientist observed: 
This relative instability of the ecosystem, due to the imperfections of its equilibrium, is of all 
degrees of magnitude, and our means of appreciating and measuring it are still very rudimentary. 
Many systems (represented by vegetation climaxes) which appear to be stable during the 
period for which they have been under accurate observation may in reality have been slowly 
changing all the time, because the changes effected have been too slight to be noted by 
observers. Many ecologists hold that all vegetation is always changing.90 
Since this observation was offered, the myth of the balance of nature has been 
more fully exposed. Indeed, much ecological and legal scholarship has been 
devoted to the issue of what model of ecosystems should succeed the now discredited 
equilibrium paradigm and what consequences follow in respect of ecological 
legislation that is based on the attractive, but false, assumptions upon which it 
rested.91 
Notwithstanding the deconstruction of the idea of ecological stability, the difficulties 
inherent in enacting legal standards which require any particular ecological 
objective to be achieved have been recognised for some time. The dynamic character 
88 See D.B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1990) particularly Chapter 
5 which traces the ancient origins of the idea of a ‘divine order’ of nature. 
89 G.P. Marsh, Man and Nature (1864) quoted by D.B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the 
Twenty-First Century (1990) and quoted by J.B. Weiner, ‘Beyond the Balance of Nature’, 7 Duke Environmental 
Law & Policy Forum 1 (1996) at 7. 
90 A.G. Tansley, ‘The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms’, 16(3) Ecology 284 (1935) at 302. 
91 See, for example, A.D. Tarlock, ‘The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of 
Environmental Law’, 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (1994) at 1121; J.B. Weiner, ‘Beyond the Balance of 
Nature’, 7 Duke Environment Law & Policy Forum (1996) at 1; and D.B. Botkin, ‘Adjusting Law to Nature’s Discordant 
Harmonies’, 7 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum (1996) at 25. This article purposefully sidesteps 
broader discussion the merits and demerits of the ‘ecosystem management’ approach to conservation, which 
have been the focus of much debate in the United States, but less prominent in the UK. For a classic starting 
point on the extensive literature, see, R.E. Grumbine, ‘What is Ecosystem Management? 8 Conservation Biology 
(1994) at 27 and, covering more recent developments, R.O. Brooks, R. Jones and R.A. Virginia, Law and Ecology: 
The Rise of the Ecosystem Regime (2002). 
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of ecosystems and the elusiveness of identifying, measuring and realising what is to 
count as a ‘satisfactory’ ecological state may explain why binding standards of this 
kind have previously been resisted in national law. 
For example, an opportunity arose to introduce ecological quality standards as 
statutory water quality objectives under the Water Resources Act 1991.92 However, 
proposals to establish ecological quality objectives for water, and to regulate effluent 
discharges to ensure that these were met, came to nothing for reasons which reflect 
broader difficulties with this kind of objective.93 In 1995, the UK Government took 
the view that quality standards for water use classes should be kept as simple and cost 
effective as possible by only setting parameters that were objective and properly 
measurable. Following this approach, a proposal for a water quality category for 
‘general ecosystems’ was abandoned because existing methodologies did not allow 
sufficiently clear parameters to be established and monitored. Moreover, it was 
thought that the biological quality of rivers could not be directly linked to controls 
applied through effluent discharge consents, since there are factors other than water 
quality which affect biological communities. It would not be possible to know 
whether biological water quality objectives were capable of being achieved by pollution- 
control measures alone. Consequently, it would not be reasonable to impose 
potentially unachievable water quality objectives as legally binding obligations.94 
The adoption of Annex V to the Water Framework Directive presupposes that a 
methodology for assessing ecological quality of waters is now capable of being 
devised and will be sufficiently rigorous to allow obligations of this kind to be provided 
for in law. However, the question remains whether it will always be possible to 
ensure that any specified level of ecological quality of water, required by the Annex, 
can actually be realised in practice. 
The central difficulty remains that natural populations of any species may be subject 
to wide demographic variation due to a range of factors that are imperfectly 
understood and may be of a non-anthropogenic kind. Populations of many aquatic 
organisms, for example, will show significant seasonal variation, particularly where 
migratory species are involved, variations due to site-specific conditions and variations, 
perhaps for largely unknown reasons, which are not necessarily related to 
water quality or hydromorphology.95 The assumption that a poor ecological status of 
92 Under sections 82–84 Water Resources Act 1991. See the Surface Waters (River Ecosystem) (Classification) 
Regulations 1994 SI 1994 No.1057, though it is understood that no designation has ever been made of 
any waters for which water quality objectives are established under these Regulations. 
93 A comparison may also be drawn with the difficulties that have arisen in establishing water quality standards, 
at state level, for designated used such as fisheries under the United States Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 
section 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000)) where there has been a reluctance to factor in non-water quality-related threats 
to species, if necessary, recognising the need for a precautionary element in the assessment of such threats. See 
C.N. Johnston, ‘Salmon and Water Temperature: Taking Endangered Species Seriously in Establishing Water 
Quality Standards’, 33 Environmental Law (2003) at 151. See also R.W. Alder, ‘The Two Lost Books in the 
Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity’, 33 Environmental Law 
(2003) at 29, on the broader failings of the Clean Water Act to secure ‘physical and biological integrity’ of waters. 
94 See also Department of the Environment, Freshwater Quality: Government Response to the Sixteenth Report of the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1995) at 10. 
95 See R.W. Edwards, ‘Introduction’ in P.J. Boon and D.L. Howell (eds), Freshwater Quality: Defining the Indefinable 
(1997) at 3 and K.B. Pugh, ‘Organizational Use of the Term ‘Freshwater Quality’ in Britain’ ibid at 20. For 
more instances of the ways in which a water body can be subject to variation for natural or other causes, see 
European Commission, Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/ 
EC), Guidance Document No.13: Overall Approach to the Classification of Ecological Status and Ecological Potential 
(2005) Annex I para 3.3. 
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particular waters is always due to anthropogenic influence, need not, therefore, be 
well founded. Likewise, the supposition that an ‘improvement’ in water quality or 
alteration of hydromorphological conditions is guaranteed to secure a corresponding 
improvement of the ecological status of those waters, perhaps to realise a particular 
ecological quality standard, is far from established.96 In short, it may be 
impossible to meet an ecological quality standard, first, because it is not known what 
action is needed to realise it or, second, because the failure to meet the standard is 
due to non-anthropogenic reasons that no human action can prevent. 
The contrast between ecological quality standards and environmental quality standards 
in this respect is readily apparent. An environmental quality standard which, 
for example, limits the maximum amount of a chemical that may be present in a sector 
of the environment is always, in principle, achievable where that chemical enters 
the environment by human agency. Taking regulatory action to prohibit or restrict 
the entry will ensure that, sooner or later, the standard is met. An ecological standard 
that requires that a certain composition or abundance of particular species of 
flora or fauna must be present in a specified part of the environment cannot be 
similarly guaranteed. This is particularly so where the means of achieving it is not 
known or the reasons for a failure to meet the standard are non-anthropogenic. The 
causality relationship, underlying environmental quality standards and mechanisms 
for their realisation may not necessarily hold insofar as ecological quality standards 
are at issue. 
The concern, therefore, is that imposing a legal requirement that an ecological 
standard must be achieved may be requiring the unachievable unless the instability 
of ecosystems is somehow built into that standard. Clearly, there is a practical challenge 
involved in reconciling the need for explicit and determinate ecological quality 
standards with natural variability, but variability in environmental quality has 
been recognised in previous Community legislation concerning water quality.97 Perhaps, 
a comparable approach to natural variability needs to be somehow incorporated 
in relation to ecological quality standards. Depending upon the way that 
precise criteria for abundance and variety of species are eventually formulated, and 
the extent to which they accommodate variation, Annex V to the Water Framework 
Directive may be adhering to a paradigm of ecological stability which is no longer 
endorsed by ecological science. Moreover, the assumption that it makes about the 
achievability of ecological quality standards may prove to be ill founded. 
96 For example, ‘even for those areas, such as the Dutch coastal zone and the Wadden Sea, where it was 
assumed that the tenfold increase in plant production since the 1950s was controlled by phosphorus, a reportedly 
significant reduction in phosphorus inputs has not resulted in the expected reduction in plant growth’ 
[European Commission, DG Environment, Criteria Used for the Definition of Eutrophication in Marine and Coastal 
Waters (2001) at 28 citing V.N. De Jong, ‘High Remaining Productivity in the Dutch Western Wadden Sea 
Despite Decreasing Nutrient Inputs from Riverine Sources 33 Marine Pollution Bulletin (1997) at 427]. 
97 See, for example, the Bathing Water Directive (76/160/EEC) which measures compliance in statistical 
terms, so that conformity is shown where 95% of samples for imperative parameters and 90% of other parameters 
are met (other than coliforms which require 80% compliance), with samples being taken at specified intervals 
and sampling points (Art.5 and Annex). See W. Howarth and D. McGillivray, Water Pollution and Water 
Quality Law (2001) section 5.5.2. On the practical implications of dealing with the uncertainty of data in relation 
to the classification of variable water bodies, see European Commission, Common Implementation Strategy 
for the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), Guidance Document No.13: Overall Approach to the 
Classification of Ecological Status and Ecological Potential (2005) Annex I (on the Technical Approach on Achieving 
and Reporting Adequate Confidence and Precision in Classification). 
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The ecological keystone of the Water Framework Directive is that the best ecosystems 
are those that show no signs of human intervention or only minimal anthropogenic 
impact. So far as it is possible to do so, waters should be maintained at, or restored 
to, this natural state. The golden age for aquatic ecosystems, it might be speculated, 
was some time before human activities first began to impact upon them, and the 
strategic ecological objective seems to be that of returning waters to this state insofar 
as this is feasible. 
Even in those countries where large areas of land have escaped the most obvious 
impacts of human development, there are profound doubts about the existence of 
truly pristine ecosystems. As has been confidently asserted, 
[t]here is no longer any part of the Earth that is untouched by our actions in some way, either 
directly or indirectly, there are no wildernesses in the sense of places completely unaffected 
by people.98 
However, this passage needs to be read as a broad statement which encompasses 
the full range of effects attributable to non-developmental impacts, such as 
climate change, ozone depletion, migration of toxic substances, destruction of 
habitat, wildlife extinction and introduction of non-native species.99 The assertion 
that no genuine ‘wilderness’ exists is scientifically incontrovertible insofar as it is 
impossible to find any area of the globe that is completely unimpaired by any of 
these factors. Nonetheless, there is a perception that requiring a total absence of 
any measurable form of human impact for an area to qualify as a ‘wilderness’ is 
setting too high a standard, and areas should not be disqualified where the 
impacts are of an indirect or imperceptible kind. Ecological scientists might justifiably 
assert that this willingness to accept areas as pristine, where they have been 
changed by human action, is an illusion or self-deception. Nonetheless, most of 
us, placed in an area hundreds of miles from human habitation, without any discernable 
signs of development or other human impact, could hardly be accused 
of misusing the English language by describing such an area as a ‘wilderness’. The 
dispute, therefore, is about the disparity between common perception and ecological 
science. 
The debate about the existence of wilderness, or how ‘wilderness’ is to be 
defined, is not directly relevant to the UK where claims to areas of land with 
wilderness status are not commonly made. However, the argument is paralleled 
by one couched in the equally obscure terminology of ‘naturalness’ and the 
arguably illusory character of areas of land claimed to be ‘natural’. As has been 
pointed out, 
There are no truly natural areas left in Britain. Everything except remote cliff ledges has been 
affected either directly or indirectly by man...Nature is always trying to restore some sort of 
98 D.B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1990) at 194 and see also B. 
McKibben, The End of Nature (1990). 
99 B. Pardy, ‘Changing Nature: the Myth of Inevitability of Ecosystem Management’, 20 Pace Environmental 
Law Review 675 (2003) at 679. Similarly, it has been suggested that even upland rivers in Britain are significantly 
damaged by acidification, excessive penetration of sunlight increasing water temperature, soil erosion 
clogging the gravel where fish spawn and dams and weirs blocking the passage of migratory fish (Anon, ‘Defining 
Ecological Quality: The Water Framework Challenge’, 347 ENDS Report December (2003) at 22. 
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equilibrium, and given sufficient time she succeeds in establishing new communities, into the 
organisation of which the human factor may enter to a greater or a lesser degree.100 
The unavoidable fact is that the national landscape has been almost completely 
modified by the activities of past generations through a range of agricultural practices 
and development activities. The extent of human intervention is such that 
almost nothing remains that is ‘natural’, in the sense of never having been 
impacted upon directly or indirectly by human beings. Similar observations may be 
offered about the ‘natural’ status of aquatic ecosystems, where human intervention 
over many centuries has resulted in the extensive hydrological modification of 
waters and their catchments, and involved the introduction of many non-native 
species of fauna and flora that would not ‘naturally’ be present. In a strict sense, 
the ‘natural’ status of land, water and ecosystems might be seen to be ‘corrupted’ 
beyond redemption. 
On the other hand, it is far from clear that ‘naturalness’ is generally understood in 
the minimal anthropogenic impact sense adopted by the Water Framework Directive 
or that achieving this state is actually seen as a contemporary conservation priority.101 
In the first place, it is far from clear that most of us would understand ‘naturalness’ 
in the sense of being totally pristine. In the second place, the quest for minimal 
anthropogenic impact dismisses or devalues human impacts that may actually be 
regarded as ecologically beneficial. 
A good legal example is to be seen in the Star Pit case,102 where the dispute was 
about the powers of the Nature Conservancy Council to designate a Site of Special 
Scientific Interest.103 The site at issue consisted of an area of shallow saline water, 
which lay in a disused clay pit, and supported a population of scarce water beetles 
which, the Council maintained, justified the designation of the site. The peculiarity of 
the factual situation was its artificiality. The circumstances that created and maintained 
the habitat for the population of beetles were the result of the pumping of 
saline water into the Star Pit from an adjoining area which was used as a landfill site 
and the pumping of water out into an adjoining dyke. The pumping operations, which 
had taken place for a relatively short period of less than ten years, had the effect of 
maintaining the shallow depth of saline water upon which the beetles depended. If the 
salinity of the water had decreased, or the water level been allowed to rise to a higher 
level, it was thought that the population of beetles would have been lost. Both of these 
100 W.D. Adams, Nature’s Place (1986) at xi. See also W.D. Adams, Future Nature (1996) at 5, where the same 
author even seems to have had some doubts about the ‘naturalness’ of the coastline: ‘The coast of the UK 
seems to be natural and unchanging, but its naturalness and sense of permanence is to a large extent illusory. 
Not only is it an illusion, it is one deliberately created, a skilful trompe l’oeil ... [Its] naturalness ... is achieved by 
a whole battery of legal and administrative measures ... and by a wide range of organisations ... [who] make 
their contribution to the ‘naturalness’ of the coast ...’. 
101 A contrast may also be drawn between minimal anthropogenic impact and the legal understanding of 
‘naturalness’ in another context. ‘Natural habitats’ is defined for the purposes of the Habitats Directive (92/ 
43/EEC) to mean ‘terrestrial or aquatic areas distinguished by geographic, abiotic and biotic features, whether 
entirely natural or semi-natural’ [Art.1(b)]. In Newsum and Others v Welsh Assembly Government [2004] EWHC 50 
(Admin) at paras 118–120, it was stated that ‘semi-natural’ means natural ‘partly by the activity and effect of 
nature and partly by the activity and effect of man’ and, on that basis, the argument that the site was not seminatural 
was rejected. 
102 R v Nature Conservancy Council, ex parte London Brick Property Ltd [1996] Env LR 1. 
103 Under section 28 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, now amended by the Countryside and Rights of Way 
Act 2000. 
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factors depended upon the continuation of pumping operations which were entirely 
under human control. 
Legally, the Star Pit case is important in establishing that the prospect of loss of a 
habitat at some stage in the future is not a reason why an area should not be designated 
as a Site of Special Scientific Interest, providing that it meets the special interest 
criteria at the time when the designation is confirmed. Factually, the case 
provides a pertinently extreme illustration of the dependency of nature upon conditions 
created and maintained almost entirely by human intervention. Far from minimal 
anthropogenic impact, the survival of the beetle population actually required 
significant anthropogenic impact on a continuing basis. 
The Star Pit case might be seen as an acute example of biodiversity being 
dependent upon human activity, but it is far from being an isolated example of the 
need for conservation of a non-natural ecosystem. A rough and ready survey of the 
seven site-specific cases on ‘nature conservation’ reported in the 2004 volume of 
the Environmental Law Reports indicates a high proportion of situations where the 
site at issue had little, if any, claim to be ‘natural’ in the minimal anthropogenic 
impact sense. 
Hence, in Fisher v English Nature,104 the site, which was found to be properly confirmed 
as a site of special scientific interest because of its bird population, was an 
area of intensively farmed land, almost entirely the result of intensive farming activities 
and certainly not a ‘natural’ habitat.105 In Newsum v Welsh Assembly,106 the site at 
issue was a disused quarry in which water had accumulated and had been colonised 
by protected great crested newts over the previous twenty years. Although the issue 
was specifically raised as to whether this site was a sufficiently ‘natural’ habitat for the 
purposes of the Habitats Regulations, it was found to be within the broad category of 
a ‘semi-natural’ habitat within the meaning of the Regulations and the Habitats 
Directive.107 In Trailer and Marina (Leven) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs and English Nature,108 the site at issue was a length of canal 
which had been constructed in 1802, but ceased to be used by commercial traffic in 
1935.109 Again, given the human construction of the canal, it must be characterised 
104 [2004] Env LR 7 [2003] EWHC 1599 (Admin) QBD (Admin Ct) (under section 28 Wildlife and Countryside 
Act 1981, as amended). 
105 The area was found to be especially suitable for nesting by stone curlew because cultivation had resulted 
in large areas of relatively bare ground with only short vegetation. This suited the curlews because the unobstructed 
vista allowed them to be aware of predators, and the open stony ground allowed their eggs to be camouflaged. 
106 [2004] Env LR 39 [2004] EWHC 50 (Admin), reversed by the Court of Appeal in [2004] EWCA (Civ) 
1565. 
107 Conservation (Natural Habitats etc) Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No.2716) and the Habitats Directive (92/ 
43/EEC). See n 101 above on the definition of ‘natural habitats’ (including ‘semi-natural habitats’) under 
Art.1(b) Habitats Directive. 
108 [2004] Env LR 40 [2004] EWHC 153 QBD (Admin) (subsequently see R (on the Application of Trailer & 
Marina (Leven) Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and English Nature [2004] EWCA 
Civ 1580) where the dispute concerned compensation in relation to management agreements for sites of special 
scientific interest (under sections 28–32 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, as amended by section 75(1) 
and Schedule 9 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000) and its compatibility with rights of peaceful enjoyment 
of property (under Art.1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
109 Perhaps as a result of the disuse, and because of the clean and calcareous water supply, the canal supported 
an exceptionally wide range of aquatic plants and was rated amongst the best national examples of standing water 
plant diversity. 
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as a non-natural habitat, but was nonetheless noted as being one amongst a number 
of canals supporting the greatest diversity of plant species of all categories of still 
waters.110 
Clearly, it would be rash to draw categorical inferences from such a limited survey 
of the factual contexts of cases raising quite different legal issues. Nonetheless, if 
those disputes that have come to be considered by the national courts are anything 
to go by, the application of conservation law to non-natural habitats is a major concern. 
The indications are that a significant proportion of those sites that give rise to 
legal proceeding could not be categorised as ‘natural’, in the minimal anthropogenic 
sense, but this is not seen as having any adverse reflection upon their conservation 
importance. 
It is difficult to see how far this line of reasoning can be pursued. Recognising the 
non-natural character of much that is considered worthy of ecological protection is not 
the same thing as supposing that artificiality is worthy of ecological protection for its 
own sake. Nonetheless, the point remains that ‘naturalness’, as it is commonly understood, 
is a remarkably flexible concept that does not preclude human impact and, in 
the circumstances of an extensively developed country, many conservation tasks seem 
to be intimately dependent upon continuing human intervention. The disparities, 
therefore, between what is commonly regarded as being of ecological value and the 
need for minimal anthropogenic impact approach are readily apparent. The apparent 
failure of the Water Framework Directive to recognise this disparity in approaches to 
ecological valuation must, therefore, be a matter of concern. 
110 The other four reported cases on site-specific nature conservation, and the sites at issue, were the following. 
First, R. (on the Application of Brown) v Secretary of State for Transport [2004] Env LR 2 [2003] EWHC 819 
(Admin) QBD (Admin Ct) involving a challenge to a planning permission and compulsory purchase orders for 
the construction of a bypass bridge over the Taw estuary on the basis that an existing site of special scientific 
interest (under section 28 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981) should have been designated as a special protection 
area under the Wild Birds Directive (79/409/EEC) and that a licence should have been obtained in 
respect of deliberate disturbance of protected species [under Reg.39 Conservation (Natural Habitats etc) Regulations 
1994, SI 1994 No.2716]. The site was an area of saltmarsh which seems to have been ‘natural’ insofar 
as there was no indication of it having been modified by human activity, though few details of the character of 
the site are provided in the report. Second, Bown v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions 
[2004] Env LR 26 [2003] EWCA Civ 1170 (the Court of Appeal decision in Env LR 2) in relation to the planning 
permission allowing the construction of a bypass bridge over the Taw estuary. Although more evidence 
was considered as to the populations of protected birds inhabiting the site, no further information was provided 
as to its natural or modified character. Third, Moggridge v National Assembly for Wales [2004] Env LR 18 
[2003] EWHC 2188 (Admin) QBD (Admin Ct), concerning challenge to compulsory purchase orders to allow 
road construction associated with a business park development, amongst other things, because construction 
would disturb a protected bat population and insufficient regard had been given to obligations under the Habitats 
Directive (92/43/EC) and the Conservation (Natural Habitats etc) Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No.2716) 
giving rise to an offence concerning the disturbance of bats. Although information about the site was sparse, 
the project was located in an urban area surrounded by coal mining, industrial and agricultural communities. 
It was noted that ongoing surveys indicated that the bats roosted in holes in trees on land on the site of the proposed 
road, and these trees would need to be felled to allow the road to be constructed. The ‘natural’ character 
of the woodland was not specifically addressed. Fourth, R (on the Application of Friends of the Earth) v 
Environment Agency [2004] Env LR 31 concerning a challenge to a modification of a waste management licence 
allowing the dismantling of ships containing toxic waste substances at a location close to a site of special scientific 
interest and a special area of conservation (under the Habitats Directive (92/43/EC) and the Conservation 
(Natural Habitats & c.) Regulations 1994, SI 1994 No.2716). The dismantling site was located in a heavily 
industrialised area, between a power station and a chemical plant, but fronted on to a channel, directly opposite 
to the special area of conservation. The area itself was described as comprising intertidal sand and 
mudflats, rocky shore, saltmarsh, freshwater marsh and sand dunes, and supporting large numbers of water 
birds. The general impression was of a natural ‘oasis’ closely surrounded by the most intrusive kinds of industrial 
land use. 
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5.3 Human Beings and Ecosystems 
 
The issues concerning ‘naturalness’ prompt the broader question of the extent to 
which human beings should be seen as a part of, or apart from, natural ecosystems. 
On this, it is notable that the minimal anthropogenic impact requirement under the 
Water Framework Directive takes the extreme position that the best ecosystems are 
those in which human beings play no part, or almost no part. Depending upon what 
view is taken of the concept of ‘naturalness’, it is at least arguable that the all-pervasiveness 
of human impacts is such that an ecosystem that genuinely met this criteria 
does not exist, for the reasons given previously. However, defining high-status ecosystems 
out of existence seems a rather pointless exercise, and it may be more productive 
to focus attention upon the exact meaning of ‘minimal’ in the context of 
minimal anthropogenic impact.111 
The dilemma is whether human beings should be placed within or outside ecosystems. 
The argument for inclusion is that humans are animals that have lived alongside 
other species for a great length of time. They have as good a claim to be a ‘natural’ part 
of an ecosystem as any other species that inhabit it. There is little apparent difficulty in 
accepting this view in relation to primitive hunter-gatherer Homo sapiens, despite 
increasing evidence of the significant impacts they had upon ecosystems even in prehistoric 
times.112 However, recognising the biological claim of human beings to be 
regarded as a part of an ecosystem leads down a slippery slope to the conclusion that all 
human impacts are, therefore, ‘natural’ modifications of ecosystems. The inference 
that buildings, roads and all the other infrastructure that is a part of life in a developed 
country is a part of a natural ecosystem is one that must be resisted if only for the reason 
that it seems to rob the concept of ‘naturalness’ of any distinct meaning. A similarly 
absurd consequence might be that ecological quality standards would need to be formulated 
for the number and kind of human being that would need to be present in 
each kind of ecosystem! 
The dilemma of characterising the place of human beings in ecosystems is a 
modern reformulation of the most ancient of philosophical challenges, that of 
determining the extent to which human beings are in or out of nature, and this 
quandary is not resolvable outside equally weighty debates about the essential character 
of ‘human beings’ and ‘nature’.113 Nonetheless, some insights into whether 
human beings should be seen as residents of, or intruders upon, natural ecosystems 
have been offered in the analogy of a marketplace. Hence, it is suggested that 
111 On the meaning of ‘minimal’, it has been noted that the Water Framework Directive defines ‘good ecological 
status’, amongst other things, to allow ‘low levels of distortion’ of biological elements resulting from 
human activity, but these should deviate from undisturbed conditions ‘only slightly’ (see Annex V Table 1.2), 
see Section 4 above. ‘Minimal’, therefore, seems to be used to mean something less than ‘slight’ in the terminology 
of the Directive, but the practical meanings of these terms remain to be determined. On the implications 
of defining high-status ecosystems out of existence, see the comments attributed to Paul Logan of the 
Environment Agency reported in Anon., ‘Defining Ecological Quality: The Water Framework Challenge’ ENDS 
Report 347, December 22 (2004) at 24. 
112 See D.B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1990) at 52, giving the 
example of how populations of tree species have been extensively modified by burning by American Indians 
and see L. Gooden, ‘Preserving Natural Heritage: Nature as Other’, 22 Melbourne University Law Review (1998) 
at 719 on the need to displace the ‘separate’ vision of people and nature with a more integrative approach to 
natural heritage law. 
113 For an interesting recent discussion of the broader context, see S. Coyle and K. Morrow, The Philosophical 
Foundations of Environmental Law: Property, Rights and Nature (2004). 
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human beings move from being benign components in natural ecosystems at the 
point where they exert disproportionate influence upon that ecosystem by the exertion 
of a monopoly power over environmental modification.114 Conversely, the test 
of ‘disproportionate influence’ in the use of a monopoly power may be seen as 
another equally slippery slope in begging the question, disproportionate to what?115 
In which case, it has to be acknowledged that humans are unavoidably immersed in 
nature but have to make choices about how to act. The monopoly power of humans 
over other nature is not going to disappear but needs to be exercised benignly in the 
interests of all ecosystem components, including human beings: ‘Nature in the 
twenty-first century will be a nature that we make; the question is the degree to 
which this moulding will be intentional or unintentional, desirable or undesirable’. 
116 Put another way, the key legal choice to be made is about the allocation of 
rights and duties that distinguish humans from other components of ecosystems and 
determine how individuals are allowed to act in relation to other kinds of biodiversity. 
Humans, therefore, are part of nature, but have powers and obligations that distinguish 
their position from the rest of nature. 
All this is difficult to reconcile with the minimal anthropogenic impact requirement 
under the Water Framework Directive, which supposes that any human impact 
upon an ecosystem inevitably reduces its value. Although ambiguous as to the meaning 
of ‘minimal’, the requirement seems close to a denial that humans are a part of 
nature. Beyond that, minimal anthropogenic impact suffers from the almost exclusive 
focus upon the negative impacts of human beings featured in the human– 
nature debate. The possibility that human beings might ever have a positive effect 
upon ecosystems seems to be excluded as a matter of principle. 
These assumptions have been seen to lead to counter-intuitive conclusions when 
applied to extensively developed countries like the UK. As the previous discussion of 
‘naturalness’ has demonstrated, the ordinary understanding of naturalness does not 
preclude human involvement, and a large proportion of legal disputes seem to be 
about non-natural habitats which have been quite substantially influenced by human 
impacts. The fact that these ecosystems have value because of human involvement, 
rather than despite it, seems to show a degree of symbiosis between humans and 
other living things which contradicts valuation by minimal anthropogenic impact. 
Undeniably, many of the disputes reaching the courts are about parcels of nature 
that human beings have themselves created, but they are valued nonetheless because 
of that. In short, ecological valuation according to the minimal anthropogenic 
impact principle seems to rest upon a ‘them and us’ philosophy that measures the 
value of ecosystems according to the degree of human exclusion and denies that 
human impacts can ever be beneficial to ecosystems. Both of these assumptions are 
difficult to defend for the reasons that have been given. The two-way relationship of 
interdependency between humans and the global ecosystem may actually be greatly 
more significant than minimal anthropogenic impact recognises. 
114 B. Pardy, Changing Nature: the Myth of Inevitability of Ecosystem Management’, 20 Pace Environmental 
Law Review 675 (2003) at 684–685. Also see O.A. Houch, ‘Are Humans Part of Ecosystems?’, 28 Environmental 
Law (1998) at 1, suggesting that although humans are parts of ecosystems, they are not the measure of ecosystems 
and management goals need, primarily, to consider species other than human beings. 
115 J.B. Ruhl, ‘The Myth of What is Inevitable under Ecosystem Management: a Response to Pardy’, 21 Pace 
Environmental Law Review 315 (2004) at 319. 
116 D.B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1990) at 193. 
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The alternative to the ‘back to nature’ philosophy underlying the Water Framework 
Directive would be an approach to ecological valuation which takes greater account 
of human interrelationship with species and habitats. Certainly, ecosystems that have 
attained and maintained a degree of stability, despite, or because of, human involvement 
should be protected from sudden or serious disruption. For example, longstanding 
farming practices involving particular livestock grazing or land use regimes, 
which have enabled distinctive kinds of flora and fauna to thrive, should be protected 
by legal means where necessary to maintain a level of biodiversity.117 Similarly, 
forestry activities that have proved their value in supporting the range of biodiversity 
characteristic of coppiced woodland should be continued. Many other kinds of 
developed land use might equally give rise to important and valuable ecosystems 
which justify legal protection. However, caution clearly needs to be exercised in 
relation to abrupt developmental changes in land use that may cause ecological 
damage because of the incapacity of key species to adapt to such changes. Nonetheless, 
an approach which focuses upon the sustainability118 of diverse ecosystems with 
a human component seems to correspond more closely with general perceptions of 
ecological valuation and offers a degree of flexibility that minimal anthropogenic 
impact denies. Hence, ecological quality standards should reflect and respect balanced 
symbiosis between human and non-human ecological components, in many 




If ecological law is to catch up with the consequentialist methodology of environmental 
quality law, ecological quality standards need to be formulated and legal powers 
used purposively to ensure that those standards are achieved and maintained. Generalised 
concerns with ecological impacts in environmental quality directives, and the 
obscure provision for adverse ecological impacts to which these give rise, are an 
unsatisfactorily indirect approach. Whilst recognising present limitations of knowledge 
of the dynamics of ecosystems, and the character and extent of human impacts 
upon species and habitats, ecological quality standards are needed to specify explicit 
and determinate requirements for the biological constituents of the environment. 
The formulation of ecological quality standards is a significantly different exercise 
from that of establishing environmental quality standards. Environmental quality 
standards may coherently be based upon the achievement of levels of anthropogenic 
117 Notably, the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) lists under Annex I (concerned with Habitat Types of Community 
Interest whose conservation requires the designation of special areas of conservation) lowland and mountain 
hay meadows (habitat types 38.2 and 38.3). This is a curious example of a terrestrial habitat, which is recognised to 
be of value at Community level, but necessarily dependent upon an anthropogenic impact on a continuing basis. 
118 ‘Sustainability’ here refers to situations where a reasonably consistent level and quality of biodiversity 
has been attained over time and nothing prevents abrupt discontinuation. It is necessary to contrast and 
distance this idea from that of ‘sustainable development’, which is concerned, amongst other things, with 
changes to land use that may be justified on the basis of an assessment of developmental benefits weighed 
against environmental costs [on the vast literature on sustainable development a good starting point is M. 
Sunkin, D. Ong and R. Wight, Sourcebook on Environmental Law (2nd edn, 2002) Chapter 1]. Ecological sustainability 
is suggested as a basis for identification of ecosystems with a human component that should be 
ecologically valued and, therefore, justify legal protection, not to determine the very different issue of 
whether that ecological value may be sacrificed in return for a developmental gain. 
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contamination levels that are close to zero, since there is no great difficulty in 
regarding this as a ‘natural’ state of the environmental media. In relation to ecological 
quality standards, however, the ‘baseline’ against which such standards 
need to be set is less clear, and setting such standards involves challenging issues of 
ecological valuation alongside the appreciation that there are practical limits to 
the achievability of any standard because of the variability of nature. 
The incorporation of ecological quality criteria, as a measure of the quality of 
an environmental media, under the Water Framework Directive is commendable. 
However, the criteria for ecological valuation, and particularly the criterion 
for high-status ecosystems, generate counter-intuitive consequences when 
applied in the context of an extensively developed country such as the UK. In 
particular, the ambiguity of the concept of ‘naturalness’ and the degree of symbiosis 
between human and non-human components of ecosystems seem to be 
neglected or underestimated. Minimal anthropogenic impact turns out to be 
either an elusive or an inappropriate standard to address undeniably important 
conservation concerns. Somehow, the initial approach to ecological quality standards 
needs to be developed to accommodate unavoidable ecological change 
and to recognise the potential value of anthropogenic impacts where these are 
sustainable and conducive to maintaining or enhancing biodiversity. The uneasy 
feeling is that the Water Framework Directive has wedded itself to some dubious 
assumptions about ecological valuation. 
 
